Natural Law & Right Reason in the Moral Theory of St. Thomas Aquinas by Boyd, Craig
Western Kentucky University
TopSCHOLAR®
Masters Theses & Specialist Projects Graduate School
3-1990
Natural Law & Right Reason in the Moral Theory
of St. Thomas Aquinas
Craig Boyd
Western Kentucky University
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wku.edu/theses
Part of the Catholic Studies Commons, Christian Denominations and Sects Commons,
Christianity Commons, and the Philosophy Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by TopSCHOLAR®. It has been accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses & Specialist Projects by
an authorized administrator of TopSCHOLAR®. For more information, please contact topscholar@wku.edu.
Recommended Citation






AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF THESIS
Permission is hereby
granted to the Western Kentucky University Library to make, or allow to be made
photocopies, microfilm or other copies of this thesis for appropriate research
for scholarly purposes.
reserved to the author for the making of any copies of this thesis except
for brief sections for research or scholarly purposes.
Signed:
Date: 3/ 4 
Please place an "X" in the appropriate box.
This form will be filed with the original of the thesis and will control future use of the thesis.






















Director of The Is
A1/4.mec-o /./ •-""
_
NATURAL LAW AND RIGHT REASON IN THE MORAL THEORY OF
Craig A. Boyd
ST. THOMAS AQUINAS
March 1990 111 Pages
Directed by: Arvin Vos, Alan Anderson, and Edward Schoen
Department of Philosophy/Religion Western Kentucky University
A major problem with current discussions on the moral
theory of St. Thomas Aquinas is the fact that many
interpreters present Thomas's thought as a natural-law
morality. While natural law is an element of Thomas's moral
theory, it plays a subordinate role to the virtue of
prudence.
The natural law interpreters of St. Thomas's moral
theory hold that (1) natural law is the dominant element, (2)
natural law can be treated in isolation from Thomas's account
of virtue, and (3) the principles of natural law make
Thomas's moral theory abstract and deontological. These
interpretations rarely consider the virtue of prudence.
Natural law, in Thomas's moral theory, makes general
statements about human nature and also sets the parameters
for morally good human activity. However, it fails to
function adequately on the level of an agent's particular
moral problems. The general precepts of natural law do not
function as proximate principles of human action. But the
special function of moral virtue is to provide the agent with
the necessary proximate principles of human action.
Virtue is an acquired disposition of the soul that
functions as a proximate principle of action. Holding a
special place in Thomas's moral theory, prudence is primary
among the moral virtues. It is defined as "right reason
concerning things to be done." Prudence holds a middle place
between he intellectual virtues and the moral virtues. It
requires right thinking about moral matters, but it also
requires the possession of a right appetite.
This essay includes some discussion of human nature, as
ethics is subordinated to psychology. Furthermore, we must
show how the human agent engages in moral activity, and this
requires discussing the psychological processes involved in
human action.
It is my purpose to explore the functions of natural
law and virtue and to take account of the relationship
between them in Thomas's moral theory. After establishing a
proper understanding of Thomas's view, it will be clear that
the natural-law interpreters have missed a crucial element
in his ethical theory.
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INTRODUCTION
Some twentieth-century historians of philosophy (e.g.
W.D. Hudson and Norman Robinson)1 assign Thomas Aquinas the
role of "the father of Natural Law Ethics." According to
these historians the dominant element in Thomas's moral
theory is an emphasis on a divinely ordained natural law
which governs man's actions.
This "natural law" interpretation concends that (1)
natural law is the dominant el2ment of Thomas's moral theory;
(2) that natural law can be treated in isolation from
Thomas's doctrine of virtue and right reason, and (3) that
the principles of natural law provide humanity with abstract,
deontological rules of moral behavior.
Both Hudson and Robinson contend that natural law is
the dominant element in Thomas's moral theory. In reference
to Thomas's thought, Hudson
dominated by the concept of
claims: "It (Thomistic ethics) is
natural law."2 Agreeing with
this perspective, Robinson states, "St. Thomas is chiefly
regarded as an exponent of the theory of natural law."3
Secondly, the proponents of this natural law
interpretation of Thomas's moral philosophy think that a
discussion of natural law, in isolation from Thomas's account
of virtue and right reason, is a sufficient treatment of
Thomas's moral theory. Robinson never mentions Thomas's
"Treatise on the Virtues." The term "prudence" is ignored
altogether. And "reason" is mentioned only as a vague entity
that comes to understand "the good" and the "natural law.
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Finally, the natural law interpreters take Thomas's
moral theory as providing all humans with only abstract,
deontological principles of moral behavior. They claim that
reason apprehends "man's natural good. o Humans come to
recognize the natural law, as founded upon their own nature.
The agent derives all norms of behavior from the natural law,
seemingly as deontological principles. The principles of
natural law are intuited and construed as incommensurable and
absolute moral norms that never admit of exception ("Do not
kill, ever."). From the natural law we get the prohibitions
against murder, theft, and adultery, without any
consideration of how to incorporate these prohibitions into
our daily affairs. Robinson claims that tile natural law 
u.
. . highly abstract. The concept of human nature
operative in the thought of St. Thomas, was much less
concrete than to be found in . Thomas Hobbes."6
In the early 1970s this traditional view was challenged
by Vernon Bourke and James Weisheipl.
7
While Bourke and
Weisheipl agree that Aquinas has been viewed as a natural law
ethicist, Bourke claims that recta ratio (i.e. "right
reason") is the essential element in Thomas's ethical theory.
3
Hence, it is better called "orthological" ethics.8 A
correct understanding of the relationships between various
moral agents and the universe with which these agents come
into contact is the foundational principle in orthological
ethical theory. Specifically, Thomas's moral doctrine is
based on man's ability to use his reason in a correct manner
so that he behaves in an ethical fashion (i.e. so that his
actions are in accordance with his rational faculty). When
man departs from right reason, he is no longer acting in a
moral manner.
In this discussion 1 will deal with the problems of
interpretation of Natural law as found in St. Thomas's
writings in the following manner. I will begin by giving, in
chapter one, a brief summary of Thomas's account of Natural
law. In the second chapter, I will discuss how demonstration
works in moral science. In chapter three, I will consider
the nature of the human act. To understand the nature of the
human act, I will consider the nature of habit and virtue in
chapter four. In chapter five, I will note how prudence is
the primary moral virtue. And in chapter six, I will relate
the Natural law to Thomas's account of virtue, and I shall
relate my position to Hudson's and Robinson's interpretation
of Thomas's moral theory.
One point that should be noted before embarking on this
project is that the notion of right reason is crucial to the
entire discussion. Right reason is not only central to the
4
practice of moral science, but it is also crucial to Thomas's
account of prudence.
Through the discussion I hope to show that (1) natural
law is an important element in Thomas's moral theory but it
is not the most important element; (2) virtue or prudence
has pride of place in Thomas's moral philosophy, and (3)
Thomas's moral theory is neither abstract nor deontological.
NOTES
1. W.D. Hudson ed. Aquinas and Natural Law, D.J.
O'Connor. (London: Macmillan, 8). Norman RobTiTon The
Groundwork of Christian Ethics. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,
1971). See Tirso Michael Bayles and Kenneth Henley eds. Right 
Conduct: Theories and Applications. (New York: Random House,
1983).
2. Hudson, editor's preface.
3. Robinson, 36.
4. Bayles and Henley, in Right Conduct, do mention the
notion of virtue. However, it is obvious from their treatment
of Thomas that they fail to understand the importance of
virtue. This failure is seen by simply noting that they use
the "Treatise on Law" for their selection from Thomas. No
reference is made to the "Treatise on the Virtues."
5. Robinson, 125.
6. Ibid.
7. Vernon Bourke "Is Thomas Aquinas a Natural Law
Ethicist?" in The Monist Vol. 58 (1974). James Weisheipl
Friar Thomas Aquino: His Lite, Thought and Works.




Natural law is one type of law, and so both shares some
qualities with other kinds of law and has some unique
properties. As law it has similarities for Thomas to the
eternal law, human law, and divine law. First, I will set
natural law in the context of law in general and then look at
the elements that are unique to this law.
All laws share certain common characteristics. The
four common elements of all law include that it is (1) "an
ordinance of reason," (2) "for the common good," (3) "made by
the authority who has care of the community," and (4)
"promulgated." Each of these must be considered separately.
One of the primary elements of law is that it is an
"ordinance of reason" that guides human activity.
Law is a rule and measure of acts, whereby man is
induced to act or is restrained from acting: for
lex (law) is derived from li are (to bind), because
TT—binds one to act. Now the rule and measure of
human acts is the reason, which is the first
principle of human acts. . . . Consequently it
follows that law is something pertaining to reason
(Summa Theologiae la2ae. 90,1).
Law is an order that issues from reason on more than
one level and in more than one context. God orders the
structure of the universe; the laws that govern the universe
5
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are derived from divine reason. The nature of the universe
is limited by God's reason. Human law is likewise an order
that issues from human reason, that prohibits, or restrains,
certain actions. Since it is reason's function to command
and guide action, law sets limits to what actions that can be
commanded.
Law is a rational command of the intellect. Now to act
rationally is to have a purpose, to act for an end.
Therefore, command always operates with a view to an end.
But to what end is law ordered? All laws are ordered to the
common good as their end, according to Thomas.
Secondly, law is ordered for the common good. In other
words, a law is a command given by a ruler that benefits an
entire community. All laws are ordered to the common good.
Ideally, human laws are ordered for the common good of
individual communities. For example, the law of the city is
ordered to the good of the city; the law of society is good
for the whole society. As regards the universe, law is such
that all beings are ordered in relation to a common good.
Humans are ordered to the good of their communities (e.g.
meeting each other's needs and living peacefully). The
common good of non-rational animals is the perpetuation of
the species.
The individual finds his or her good in the common good
of the community. This principle holds true especially of
human communities.
7
Whoever promotes the common welfare of the
community promotes his own welfare at the same
time: and this for two reasons. First, because
individual well-being cannot exist without the
welfare of the family, or city, or realm. . • •
Secondly, because man, being part of the family, or
of the city, it is right that he should consider
his personal well-being in the light of what
prudence advises with regard to the common welfare
(2a2ae. 47,10,ad2).
And again,
You assess the goodness of any part in relationship
to its whole. . . . Since every person is part of a
political community he cannot he good unless he be
well adjusted to the common good, nor can the
community be sound unless its parts are in keeping
(1a2ae. 92,1,ad2).
Human beings are social beings by their very nature as they
"require relationships with others." Furthermore, all humans
depend on others for their needs.
1
 The individual good does
not exist apart from the common good. Law provides the
framework whereby all members are ordered to the common good.
Thirdly, law finds its origin in the one who has charge
of the community. The authority who is in charge of the
community may be either an individual or a group, "[Ti make
law is the office of the entire people or of the public
personage who has care of them" (1a2ae. 90,3). God has
charge of the universal community of all beings. The source
of legitimate human law is the ruler of the individual
society, as he has in his care all the citizens of that
community. A father has the responsibility of caring for his
family.
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The authority who has charge of the community must be
able to enforce the law. A law without enforcement is no law
at all. Penalties and rewards are attached to the precepts
of law. For example, a law requiring taxation must be
enforced. Taxes are no longer obligatory if no punishments
are meted out to those who refuse to pay. The ruler must be
able to punish the tax evader.
The one who makes law must be in a position such that
his authority is greater than any individual within the
community. Thus, the entire people or the public ruler, or
God, has an authority that is greater than any individual.
Finally, laws must be promulgated. A law must be made
known to those to whom it applies, as in the case of subjects
being made aware of a king's law regarding taxes.
The natural law is promulgated from the fact that
humans come to know it by means of their own cognitive
abilities, without direct divine revelation. Human laws are
promulgated as they apply to each member of the community by
means of official declaration. Yet, sometimes humans are
subject to law and sometimes they make law.
Law can be found in something in two different ways,
according to Thomas. The first way is "in that which rules
and measures," (1a2ae. 90,1) which Thomas believes is
characteristic of reason. The second way is found in that
"which is measured and ruled."(1a2ae. 90,1) In other words,
law may apply to entities essentially or by way of
9
participation.
Taken as a rule and measure, law can be present in
two manners, first, and this is proper to the
reason, as in the ruling and measuring principle,
and in this manner it is in the reason alone;
second, as in the subject ruled and measured, and
in this manner law is present wherever it
communicates a tendency to something, which
tendency can be called derivitively, though not
essentially, a 'law' (1a2ae. 90,1).
This distinction is made in order to point out that law is
found essentially in reason. Law is a fuction of reason's
active ordering capacity. The capacity to enact law is found
only in those beings that are essentially rational. However,
law also can be seen at work in those things that are ruled
by law. In this second sense we find that law governs the
behavior of the animal kingdom, as the animals are governed
by laws of nature. Rational beings (e.g. God and humans)
have the capability of instituting laws, as law is found in
them essentially (i.e. in their reason). God promulgates the
eternal and natural laws, while man promulgates human law.
So while humans are subject to divine law and their nature
manifests natural law, they formulate human law.
Law is an essential element for humans in two ways.
Humans participate in the eternal and natural laws, as they
are governed by God's reason. Humans necessarily seek "the
good." As human beings, we have no choice but always seek
what is perceived to be good. God determines the nature of
the cosmos and humanity and in this way humans participate in
God's reason as a part of God's creation.
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There is no choice about being created to seeking the
good. But what good is chosen can be governed by human mind
and will.
The rational creature directs his own life by mind
and will, each of which needs to be ruled and
bettered by God's mind and will. This is why over
and above the guidance by which he rules himself as
master of his actions, the rational creature needs
to be ruled by God (la. 103,5,ad3).
So in addition to being governed by divine reason, humans
also have the capacity to act- , and institute laws, on their
own.
We can contrast humanity with an inanimate object. For
example, a rock must obey the law of gravity when it is
dropped from a cliff because mass and weight are part of the
rock's characteristics. In this way it participates in the
law of gravity, which God's reason instituted. However, the
rock has no power of its own to choose, as it does not
possess a rational soul. The rock is governed by God's
legislation regarding laws of nature.2 Non-rational beings
merely participate in the laws governing the universe. They
do not have the capacity to govern their own behavior.
In summary, law is a command of reason, for the common
good, coming from one who has charge of the community, and is
promulgated. Having seen how law functions, we may now turn
our attention to the purpose of law.
Thomas claims that the purpose of law is the universal
good, or end, of things. Now this may be taken in two ways.
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Humans have a natural common good and a supernatural common
good.
The supernatural common good is communion with God,
i.e. the beatific vision. "Now the last end of human life is
bliss or happiness" (Contra Gentiles 1,25). And this is a
common good (i.e. all humans desire this end, which is
ultimately found in God). This is the desire of all
intellectual beings.
Human life also has another common good. This common
good is the natural good of all human societies. It is
living in peace with other human beings.
Since all laws are directed for the common good,
someone must institute these laws. There must be a lawmaker,
if we perceive a law at work. On the cosmic level, God is
the one who establishes laws of the universe, while on the
human level, either a king or the general will of the people
institute the laws of a state.
All law is for an end, but since ends differ, there are
different types of law. There are three primary types of
law: eternal, natural and human. The eternal law is the
first and most important law. This law presupposes an
omnipotent, omniscient, eternal, Christian Sod (i.e. a
pantokrator). As this God is the all knowing one, God also
possesses what Thomas calls "Divine Reason" (1a2ae. 91).
Aquinas defines the eternal law in the following manner:
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Now it is evident, granted that the world is ruled
by Divine Providence . . . that the whole community
of the universe is governed by Divine Reason.
Wherefore the very Idea of the government of things
in God the Ruler of the universe, has the nature
of a law. And since the Divine Reason's conception
of things is not subject to time but is eternal...
it is that this kind of law must be eternal (1a2ae.
91,1).
The eternal law is that which governs the entire universe,
which issues forth from God, the Divine Ruler. It is by the
eternal law that the laws of physics, animal behaviour, and
plant growth are all promulgated.
God impresses on the whole of nature the principles
of the proper Lctivities of things . . . every act
and every motion is subject to the eternal law. In
this fashion even non-rational creatures are
subject to it through being moved by divine
Providence (1a2ae. 93,5).
The eternal law, therefore, is the activity of "Divine
Wisdom, as directing all actions and movements" (1a2ae.
93,5). Does this mean that all laws derive from divine
reason? In response, Thomas states that "Every law is
derived from the eternal law" (1a2ae. 93,3). The problem is
to understand how the eternal law relates to the natural law.
The overarching principle of law is the eternal law. Next in
importance is the natural law, which applies specifically to
human beings. This law also remains unchanged unless God
decides to change human nature. The natural law "is a.
participation in the eternal law on the part of a rational
creature" (1a2ae. 91,2). The rational creature's capacity to
act freely and to direct himself to various activities is
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mankind's participation in the eternal law. Non-rational
animals are governed by God in a different way than humans
are because they do not possess reason. They are governed by
divine reason by way of obedience (1a2ae. 93,5). Humans, on
the other hand, can "participate" in the eternal law simply
because they have minds. It is due to the human's rational
capacity that persons participate in eternal law. Therefore,
only the acts of rational creatures fall within the scope of
the natural law. The natural law is the unique element of
the eternal law that governs the activity of human beings.
Among the precepts of natural law, the most important
precept is that humans seek to find what is good, according
to the dictates of reason. Humans are the only corporeal
creature that can choose actions in accordance with reason.
And so this is the first command of (natural) law,
'that good is to be sought and done, evil to be
avoided'; all other commands of natural law are
based on this. Accordingly, then, natural-law
commands extend to all doing or avoiding of things
recognized by the practical reason as being human
goods (1a2ae. 94,2).
This basic principle (i.e. that good is to be done and
pursued and evil avoided) serves as Thomas's initial
statement of natural law. Moreover, this precept serves as
the foundation of all other precepts of natural law. These
other precepts of natural law are formulated and used in
guiding humans to human goods. Of what, then, does human
nature consist and what are human goods?
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The human soul consists of three different levels of
being: the vegetative, the sensitive and the intellectual.
Each level has a specific function that it must fulfill.
The vegetative power must maintain the human being's
existence. It maintains man's own body. Humans share this
element with all other forms of life, as self-preservation is
essential to every living being.
In addition to the vegetative power found in all living
beings, all animals have a sensitive soul. The sensitive
soul has two primary appetites: the irascible and the
concupiscible. These appetites direct the agent to sensory
goods and away from sensory evils. So, to a certain extent,
animals have cognitive sensory powers, insofar as they
apprehend objects as desirable or as avoidable.
The concupiscible appetite inclines the agent to pursue
easily attainable goods and avoid pains. In reference to
this appetite Thomas says that
through which the soul is inclined absolutely to
seek what is suitable, according to the senses, and
to fly from what is hurtful, and this is called
concupiscible (la. 81,2).
The concupiscible appetite seeks the sensory goods of food,
drink and sex. This appetite hr,s for its proper object the
"pleasurable or the painful" (la. 81,2). This appetite is
presented with a sensory good and inclines to it. For
example, a thirsty man desires a glass of water and so seeks
a nearby drinking fountain. This inclination is the
15
concupiscible appetite at work.
The irascible appetite is seen when we struggle to a
good. It seeks the difficult good. Thomas defines the
irascible appetite as that
whereby an animal resists the attacks that hinder
what is suitable, and inflict harm, and this is
called irascible (la. 81,2).
The irascible appetite has as its proper object the
"sense-good or sense-evil qua arduous, i.e. in so far as the
acquisition or avoidance involves some kind of difficulty or
struggle" (la. 81,2). For example, a female wolf sees her
cubs about to be eaten by a bear. She throws herself in
front of the bear in order to save the cubs. The irascible
appetite has prompted her to pursue the difficult good of
saving the cubs' life at her own expense. It is in this way
that the irascible appetite inclines
difficult goods.
individuals to pursue
The sensory appetites humans share with all other
animals. Klubertanz says that we could call the
concupiscible appetite the "pleasure-appetite"
irascible the "aggressive-appetite ."
and the
Humans are rational animals. So, in addition to having
vegetative and sensitive powers, they also have rational
powers. It is rationality that distinguishes humans from all
other animals.
Rationality is the salient element of human life. In
general, rationality allows a creature capacity to govern its
16
own behavior. Human beings, therefore, are autonomous beings
insofar as they can direct their own behavior (la. 103,5).
Rationality is a principle of such action.
Something . . . acts for an end in two ways. The
first consists in a self-direction towards the end,
characteristic of man and other intelligent
creatures; it is their nature to know the meaning
of end and of what is related to it (la. 103,1).
Rationality provides human beings with an autonomous
principle of action with the result that they are capable of
knowing ends and directing themselves toward these ends. But
what are these ends?
Any good that transcends the goods of the vegetative or
sensitive souls is a rational good. Knowing truths about God
and living in society are two examples of rational goods
(1a2ae. 94,3). However, pursuing intellectual truth,
acquiring virtue, developing technology, exercising one's
free will, etc. all qualify as rational goods.4 All these
goods are rational because they are appetites that transcend
the sensory level of animal existence. Non-rational animals
do not possess reason, and thus, they cannot desire to know
truth about God, acquire virtue, etc. Rationality,
therefore, sets the human being apart from all other forms of
life.
Ralph McInerny further clarifies this notion of
rationality. A rational activity is such "because it is the
activity of reason itself or because it is an activity which
comes under the sway of reason."5 Reason has activities of
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its own, e.g. contemplating God and using one's free will.
However, other activities, namely our sensitive appetites,
can be regulated by reason. Reason can determine where, with
whom, and when one may engage in sexual activity. Sexuality
is an activity of the sensitive soul but in humans it should
be regulated by reason.
But how does each type of good relate to the natural
law? We find that any inclination found in the human being
by nature has a precept of the natural law to govern it. The
natural law is the guiding rational principle for all human
behaviors. Inclinations concerning sexuality are governed
by the precept "Do not commit adultery." "Do not steal" is a
precept that is based on man's rational, communal nature.
These commands and prohibitions are precepts that all humans,
insofar as they are rational, recognize as being essentially
ordered to the pursuit of happiness. Each inclination has a
precept of the natural law to govern it. Insofar as a person
apprehends a good, there is a precept of the natural law that
relates to that inclination of the perceived good.
But do these precepts apply to all humans? Thomas
answers that the most basic principles of natural law apply
to all human beings.
It is therefore evident that, as regards the common
principles whether of speculative or of practical
reason, truth or rectitude is the same for all, and
is equally known by all . . . as to the conclusions
of the practical reason, neither is the truth or
rectitude the same for all, nor, where it is the
same is it equally known by all (1a2ae. 94,4).
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Leaving aside for the moment the question of how the
principles of natural law are known, we should point out that
the first principles of the practical 'mason (i.e. the
natural law) are the same for all humans. The common
principles of the natural law apply universally. However, we
fi that the conclusions from the first principles do not
apply universally. The common, or first principles of
natural law are known as primary precepts. The conclusions
are known as secondary precepts of the natural law. As
humans are rational, they have the capacity to reason from
these first principles to conclusions. The specifics of this
process will be dealt with at length in the next chapter.
All humans know that it is wrong to murder. This type
of principle of the natural law is a primary principle.
Hence, it is known by all humans to be a part of the natural
law. These primary precepts admit of no exceptions. One may
never murder, or engage in
spouse!' These absolute
toward their perfection as
sexual relations with another's
primary precepts propel humans
humans. Transgressing a primary
precept is never permissible because it will "always and
•
everywhere thwart the ideal.
1,7
However, there are also secondary precepts of the
natural law. Secondary precepts are "more specific precepts
which are like conclusions lying close to premises" (1a2ae.
94,6). These secondary precepts in most cases promote
19
goodness and avoid evil. However, one finds instances where
the primary and secondary precepts come into conflict.
Thomas gives the example of an individual who has lent a
weapon to a friend and wants it returned so that he can use
it against the state.
Thus, it is right and true for all to act according
to reason, and from this principle it follows, as a
proper conclusion, that goods entrusted to another
should always be returned to their owner. Now this
is true in the majority of cases. But it may happen
in a particular case that it would be injurious,
and therefore unreasonable, to restore goods held
in trust; for instance if they are claimed for the
purpose of fighting against one's country (1a2ae.
94,4).
The primary precept is "Be just." But the secondary precept
is that "One must return borrowed items." Justice, in this
case, requires that the weapon should not be returned because
an injustice will result. That is, the result of returning
the weapon would be injurious to the common good, and thus,
an injustice. Thomas makes this claim because
The practical reason . . . is concerned with
contingent matters, which is the domain of human
actions; and, consequently, although there is
necessity in the common principles, the more we
descend towards the particular the more frequently
we encounter defects (1a2ae. 94,4).
Practical science and its subject matter must be
distinguished from speculative science, as practical science
deals with contingent matters whose conclusions lack the
certainty of those in the speculative sciences. In short, in
the practical order one will often find exceptions to the
rule, which is not the case in the intellectual order. We
20
need to be able to reason about moral problems in a detailed
manner so that we can overcome the defects of practical
science. Our next chapter will deal with these issues.
To sum up, the natural law issues from God, is ordered
for the common good of humanity, coming from God, who has
charge of the human community, and is promulgated by God.
The most basic precept of the natural law is that "Good
is to be done and pursued and evil to be avoided." All other
precepts of the natural law are based on this first
principle. Goods are in proportion to the kind of being one
is. Vegetative, sensitive and rational goods are all human
goods. However, it is a rational good to order all goods
pursued by the the various appetites of the soul. As we
recall that natural law is a dictate of reason, we find that
the natural law must rationally order and unify all desires.
The natural law contains primary precepts and secondary
precepts. Primary precepts always direct us to the human
ideal and never permit of exceptions. We may never fail to
"Be just." Secondary precepts may allow of exceptions, as
they only generally guide us to the moral ideal for humanity.
These secondary precepts are more specific and provide us
with various ways to fulfill the obligation to be just.
We have just given a brief account of the natural law.
However, wo have not dealt with the important issues of how
the natural law is known and how natural law is employed in
the demonstrative process of the practical intellect. We
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must observe how the demonstrative process works and how
natural law is used in this process. Our next chapter will
consider this issue.
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6. Thomas holds that God may dispense with certain
precepts of natural law. In the Old Testament God dispenses
with the prohibition on adultery. The important issue is
that only the lawgiver may grant a dispensation. "Again Osee,
by taking unto himself a wife of fornications, or an
adulterous woman, was not guilty either of adultery or
fornication; for he took unto himself one who was his by
command of God, who is the Author of the institution of
marriage."(1a2ae. 100,8,ad3) But Hosea's actions were based
on knowledge gained by revelation, not on those moral
principles gained solely through the use of unaided reason.
7. McInerny, Ethica Thomistica, 60. McInerny
distinguishes between three levels of morality. The first is
the moral ideal, which is that which all humans aim. The
second level contains the primary precepts of the natural
law. These precepts, without fail, direct humans to the
ideal. The third level regards the secondary precepts of
natural law, which usually, directs us to the ideal.
CHAPTER 2
DEMONSTRATION IN THE PRACTICAL INTELLECT
In the first chapter we gave a brief account of the
natural law. The concept of a natural law raises several
questions. First, how are the principles of the natural law
known? How do they function in deliberative moral reasoning?
How are we to derive conclusions from these first principles?
In order to answer these questions we will begin by
discussing how it is that individuals come to acquire
knowledge. Secondly, we will discuss the nature of the
speculative and practical intellects. We will then consider
how demonstration functions in both intellectual processes.
We will also observe how it is possible to derive conclusions
from the first principles of the practical intellect. And
finally, we will take note of the limitations of moral
science.
The process of knowledge is complex. A bare account of
this process in Thomas's own terms runs as follows. Material
singulars affect the sense organs. "Every power of the
sensitive part can have knowledge only of particulars" (la.
85,1). This apprehension of the singular by the senses
produces a phantasm, i.e. an image, in the imagination.
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The intellect then abstracts from the phantasm the
universal element in the singular. The intellect "illumines"
the phantasm. This abstraction is accomplished by means of
the agent intellect. The universal element is then impressed
on the passive intellect (la. 85,1). Thus, the phantasm and
the agent intellect function together to produce the
universal in the passive intellect.
If we consider how the universal "tree" is formed, we
must start with individual trees, e.g. oak, elm or pine.
These singulars affect the sense of sight. The sense of
sight, however, perceives the tree only in its singularity.
The image of the tree is produced in the imagination. This
image is the phantasm. The agent intellect then turns to the
phantasm and illumines it. That is, by means of the agent
intellect's natural capacity, it makes the universal element
of the phantasm intelligible. The universal formal elements
of "tree" are then abstracted and impressed on the passive
intellect. The resulting concept is known as the impressed
species. The intellect now understands the term "tree" not
as singular, but as universal. "Tree" is understood not as
this tree or that tree, but as a "type of leafy vegetative
life." Thus, we have arrived at knowledge of terms. Owen
Bennett summarizes the process by saying
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The percepts of sense attain to material
individuals as individuals. The eye sees this
individual color, the ear hears this individual
sound, and so on. The form of sense is grasped in
its individuality, hence, as subject to constant
change or variation. The intellect in conceiving
its simple notion also considers individual really
existing things, but it does not consider them in
their material individuality. It prescinds rather
from that material individuality, and considers in
its concept or notion intelligible aspects of these
individual things, aspects that do not change or
vary.1
This process of knowledge begins with the material singular
entity. The intellect, then abstracts the universal form
from that singular. It is through empirical knowledge, with
the necessary functioning of the active and passive
intellect, that one gains universal knowledge. Once one is
in possession of the universal term one has the capacity to
grasp self-evident principles. For example, one knows that
to be an agent, is of necessity, to act for an end. This is
an analytically true proposition. The capacity to understand
these statements as analytically true is a function of
rationality. Yet, rationality functions in a variety of
ways.
Rationality, as it relates to these self-evident
principles, has three different functions. The first
function of rationality is apprehension (In Feriherm. I,1).
Apprehension is the simple act of presenting an idea to the
intellect. Following apprehension, the intellect judges what
is apprehended (In Periherm. 1,1). This act of judgment
either affirms or denies what is apprehended. By judgment
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one discerns whether a thing is or is not. Now the
understanding apprehends and judges self-evident principles.
As soon as the meanings are presented to the intellect, it
must judge that what the two terms refer to are identical in
some way.
Judgment either affirms or denies that a thing is. Of
the apprehended thing, judgment either affirms or negates its
existence. For example, if one considers "man," apprehension
simply grasps the qualities of the man. Judgment affirms or
denies whether a "rational animal" is the object of
apprehension. As man is a rational animal, judgment affirms
that man is rational animal. Judgment's affirmation or
denial is fundamental to the agent's ability to understand.
The understanding grasps first principles of both the
speculative and practical intellects. In the speculative
realm the understanding grasps those self-evident principles
of thought, while in the practical intellect the
understanding apprehends the first principles of action. The
apprehension of the first principles is an intellectual
habit. The purely speculative habit is known as intellectus
while the habit of the practical reason is called synderesis.
Hence it is that human nature, insofar as it comes
in contact with the angelic nature, must both in
speculative and practical matters know truth
without investigation. And this knowledge must be
the principle of all the knowledge which follows,
whether speculative or practical, since principles
must be more stable and certain (On Truth XVI,1).
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These first principles of knowledge are indemonstrable.
For a principle to be indemonstrable it must be (1) necessary
and self-evident and (2) naturally known and not acquired by
demonstration (In Meta. IV,6). Indemonstrable principles are
understood immediately by the intellect. That is, the
intellect does not require a process of reasoning in order to
grasp these principles. Furthermore, "immediate" is not to
be understood in a temporal sense. Immediate knowledge is
always grasped by the understanding in the sense that to
understand the terms is to understand the truth of the
principle. Principles that are grasped immediately by the
understanding are known as self-evident principles.
A proposition can be understood as self evident in two
ways. In one way it is self-evident in itself "when the
predicate is of the essence of the subject" (1a2ae. 94,2).
The truth of a self-evident proposition manifests itself in
the definition of the terms it uses. For example, "Every
agent acts for an end." By definition, an agent is one that
acts for an end.
In a second way, a principle is self-evident as it
exists in one's mind. In this second sense, a proposition is
self-evident only to those who are educated in a specific
discipline. Such is the case of the geometer who claims that
"The square of the hypotenuse of a right triangle is equal to
the square of the other two sides." But it is in the first
sense that Thomas wants to claim as being the one found in
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those first principles of the intellect. Thus,
Certain axioms or propositions are universally
self-evident to all; and such are the propositions
whose terms are known to all, as, Every whole is
greater than its part, and Things equal to one and
the same are equal to one another (In De Trin. 
V,1).
These self-evident propositions are known universally by all
rational beings. Insofar as one is rational, one cannot be
mistaken about these first principles (On Truth XVI,2).
Furthermore, these principles are used as the foundation for
all subsequent knowledge. If one wishes to demonstrate any
other truths, one must ultimately appeal to this immediate
knowledge.
The first fundamental principle of the speculative
intellect concerns being. The first self-evident principle
of the speculative intellect is, Thomas claims, the principle
of non-contradiction.
It is impossible . . . for anyone to be mistaken in
his own mind about these things and to think that
the same thing both is and is not at the same time.
And it is for this reason that all demonstrations
reduce to this proposition as the ultimate opinion
common to all: for this proposition is by nature
the starting point and axiom of all axioms (In
Meta. IV,).
The principle of non-contradiction provides the groundwork
for all subsequent demonstrations of the speculative
intellect. Moreover, all learning on the intellectual level
prescinds from pre-existent knowledge (In Meta. IV,6). The
principle of non-contradiction provides us with a criterion
by which all subsequent truth claims are judged. There are
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other self-evident axioms in the speculative intellect which
serve as a starting point for various demonstrations. "The
sum of the parts are never greater than the whole," and "Two
things equal to a third thing are equal to each other" are
examples of these other first principles on the speculative
level.
Thomas notes that the practical and speculative
intellects seem to function in similar ways. But exactly
what do the speculative and practical intellects do? Thomas
notes that
The same procedure takes place in the practical and
in the speculative reason, for each proceeds from
principles to conclusions . . . just as in the
speculative reason, from naturally known
indemonstrable principles we draw conclusions of
the various sciences, the knowledge of which is not
imparted to us by nature, but acquired by the
efforts of reason, so too it is that from the
precepts of natural law, as from common and
indemonstrable principles, the human reason needs
to proceed to the more particular determination of
certain matter (1a2ae. 91,3).
In the above passage a parallel is drawn between the precepts
of the natural law as found in the practical reason and those
first principles of demonstration as found in the speculative
reason. In addition both the precepts of the natural law and
the first principles of demonstration are self evident.
Therefore, a brief account should be given regarding the
nature of the speculative and practical intellects.
Secondly, a consideration of how the understanding grasps
self-evident principles and how these principles are used in
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the various sciences will be helpful. This will enable the
discussion to move to the point where we will study how the
demonstrative process unfolds.
The speculative and practical intellects are
distinguished because of different functions in the
understanding. This distinction is explained in the
commentary on Boethius's De Trinitate.
The theoretical or speculative intellect is
properly distinguished from the operative or
practical intellect in this, that the speculative
intellect has for its end the truth under
consideration, while the practical intellect
directs the truth under consideration to operation
as to its end. So the Philosopher says in the De
Anima that they differ from each other with regaTa
to their end. And he says again in the Metaphysics 
"The end of speculative science is truth, while the
end of practical science is action" (In De Trin. 
V,1).
The practical intellect is directed to operation, or
activity, as its end. On the other hand, the speculative
intellect "directs what it apprehends, not to operation, but
to the sole consideration of truth" (In De Trin. V,1).
Practical knowledge results in an activity such as building a
house or giving money to the poor. But speculative knowledge
terminates in contemplation, or more broadly, knowing or
learning something.
The sciences are bodies of knowledge that employ
demonstration. Furthermore, the purpose of science is to
demonstrate conclusions from given premises.
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The object of which scientific knowledge is sought
through demonstration is some conclusion in which a
proper attribute is predicated of some subject,
which . . . is inferred from principles (In Post. 
1,2).
Practical science seeks operation as its end, while
speculative science seeks truth. The two different sciences
employ different methods of demonstration and seek different
kinds of knowledge (In Meta. 1I,5). Furthermore, the
precision of a science, and its method of demonstration, is
determined by the subject matter of that science (In Ethic. 
1,3).
The speculative sciences are of three types: natural
science, mathematics and metaphysics (In De Trin. V,4).
Natural science investigates changing being. Mathematics
deals with accidental, quantitative, being. Metaphysics
deals with being qua being. All of the speculative sciences
concern being. The proper object of the speculative
intellect is being as such.
Since the intellect is a power, it must have a
determinate object which it naturally and
necessarily possesses. Now this object must be the
aspect under which everything is known by the
intellect . . . this formal aspect is nothing else
than being. Thus our intellect naturally knows
being and its properties and in this knowledge is
rooted the knowledge of first principles (CG.
11,83).
Being is the formal object of the intellect. As such, all
subsequent knowledge must derive from the manner in which
being is known. Being is grasped necessarily by the
understanding in the form of first principles.
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Resolution is the mode of demonstration most proper to
the speculative sciences. Resolution moves from complex
posterior principles to the universal prior simples (1a2ae.
14,5). Resolution, therefore, is that type of demonstration
that reasons from effects back to their causes. We reason in
the speculative sciences in this manner primarily because our
intellects apprehend initially what is posterior in being and
we must resolve what we apprehend back to its cause, being.
An example of this type of knowledge is the cosmological
proof for God's existence. The knowing agent initially
apprehends the world. The agent then resolves the world back
to a first cause, which is prior to the world's existence.
The order of knowing is prior, relative to the knowing agent,
to the order of being.
Although practical science also employs resolution, the
other type of demonstration, composition, is most proper to
the practical sciences. Composition moves from prior
universal simples to the complex. Composition is especially
needed for moral science, as we must actually construct the
act (In Ethic. 1,2).
The composition that is properly employed in practical
science differs from the speculative primarily in terms of
the end. The end of practical science is operation, not
contemplation. Furthermore, causes are more simple and prior
in being when compared to effects. When one demonstrates
concerning practical science one must apply simple causes to
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produce the desired effects. The order of knowing in
composition, therefore, corresponds to the order of being.
One must know what is to be done or made before actually
doing or making.
In moral science we find that we must first employ
resolution. We start with scientific knowledge of the end to
be attained. Secondly, we reason back to those intermediary
actions that will bring about the attainment of the end. This
process is known as deliberation. Thomas points out that
deliberation proceeds via resolution.
If what is prior in knowledge is posterior in
being, the process is one of resolution, as when we
judge about effects which are manifest to us by
resolving them back to their simple causes. Now the
principle in the inquiry of deliberation is the end
which, though prior in intention is nevertheless
posterior in being. Accordingly, the inquiry of
deliberation must be by way of resolution, namely,
by beginning from what is intended in the future
and continuing until one arrives at what must be
done at once (1a2ae. 14,5).
The resolution proper to the practical sciences starts with
the end to be achieved which is first in knowledge. It then
proceeds to deliberate concerning the intervening causes that
are appropriate to the attainment of that end until one
arrives at that action that must "be done at once." The
preliminary investigation is now completed and resolution
gives way to composition.
Composition applies causes to actually produce effects
that will bring about the attainment of the end.
Composition, thus, is responsible for actually constructing
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its object by applying universal simples to produce the
complex, singular entity. For example, I desire to be a
doctor. I must first investigate the notion of what a
doctors is. Secondly, I must reason back to those
intermediary causes that will produce the desired end. This
will involve obtaining a bachelor's degree with appropriate
biology and chemistry courses. This process will therefore
involve my entering college and earning an undergraduate
degree. So, I must apply to various colleges that will
provide me with the necessary training. Therefore, I must
first contact these colleges, which will involve either
making a telephone call to an admissions office or writing a
letter. At this point, the resolution is completed.
At this point, we move to the composition that is
proper to practical science. I must reason to the end
intended by applying simple universal causes to produce the
intermediary effects until I arrive at the end intended.
This process is accomplished by the practical syllogism.
Demonstration always takes place via the syllogism. In
general, a syllogism has two premises which logically lead to
a third proposition, the conclusion. In the speculative
sciences, all the terms of the syllogism are universal.
Moreover, the conclusion of the speculative syllogism always
produces a necessary conclusion (In Prior. 4).
If one employs a demonstration involving natural
philosophy, one can see how demonstration takes place in the
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speculative intellect.
Major: All mammals are animals.
Minor: All men are mammals.
CONC: All men are animals.
All of the terms in this syllogism are universal.
Furthermore, the conclusion necessarily follows from the
given premises. There is no room for error in the
conclusion. Ultimately, each premise must be in conformity
with the principle of non-contradiction. A premise that held
"All men are not men" clearly violates the principle of
non-contradiction and is not permissible in any syllogism.
Demonstration in the speculative sciences is always necessary
because the terms are always universal. This is not the case
with the practical sciences.
We begin to see the connection now between the
speculative and practical intellects. As being', is the proper
object to the speculative intellect, and the speculative
sciences, so the good is the proper object of the practical
intellect, and the practical sciences. For speculation seeks
the truth which exists or has being, and practical science
seeks the good.
The practical syllogism is used to apply the universal
principles of the natural law to individual singular cases.
The practical syllogism differs from the logical syllogism
insofar as the conclusion of the practical syllogism is
singular (la. 78,1). Furthermore, the minor premise of the
35
practical syllogism must contain a particularized judgment.
According to Bourke there are two types of the
practical moral syllogism: the purely cognitive moral
syllogism and the operative moral syllogism
The purely cognitive moral syllogism terminates in a
judgment of conscience. The syllogism starts with a
universal major premise. A particularized judgment appears
in the minor premise. And a particular judgment is reached
in the conclusion.3 Bourke gives the following example.
Major: Every evil is to be avoided
Minor: Adultery is evil
CONCL: This act of adultery is to be avoided
The major premise contains the universal first principle of
the practical reason. The minor premise gives a particular
judgment concerning a given type of behavior. This second
premise gives a concrete action as contained within the scope
of the universal. Finally, the conclusion terminates in a
judgment of conscience, which is always particular. The
conclusion is, however, only a cognitive act.
However, we find that demonstrative knowledge is not
sufficient for virtue. That is, knowing the right thing to
do simply is not enough to be considered virtuous. One must
not only know the right thing to do, one must be able to
command that action. As Wallace notes,
Those who think that they can attain the end of
moral science merely by reasoning about virtue,
without doing anything to acquire it, make a
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serious error: they miscons,true the very nature of
moral science as practical."
We must constantly keep in mind that the end of morality is
virtuous living, not merely correct thinking. Practical
science, considered completely, includes not only knowledge
of the operable, but also knowledge of how it is to be
attained with the intent of acting upon this knowledge. We
find the operative moral syllogism intends action.
The operative moral syllogism follows upon the judgment
of conscience. The minor premise contains a particularized
judgment. However, the particular conclusion is a judgment
of choice. This judgment necessarily leads to the act of
choosing and doing the action. The following example will
help to illustrate the point.
Major: I should not kill my father
Minor: This man is my father
CONC: I should not kill this man
This train of reasoning follows from the prior cognitive
syllogism which could be diagrammed as follows.
Major: Every evil is to be avoided
Minor: Patricide is evil
CONC: I should not kill my father.
In the cognitive moral syllogism we start with the first
principle of synderesis, i.e. that "Good is to be done and
evil avoided." We then use the more specific imperative of
the natural law to avoid patricide. We conclude with the
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judgment of conscience that I should not kill my father.
However, this conclusion has an imperfection. I may know
that patricide is wrong and yet consent to it. I must
continue my thought process. I need to make my reasoning
operative.
I must not only know that killing my father is wrong, I
must intend not to do it. In the operative syllogism I begin
with the judgment of conscience. In the minor premise I
utilize the judgment of particular reason. My conclusion
results in the judgment of choice. While the operative moral
syllogism intends action in its conclusion, action has not
yet taken place, as an individual may still be prevented from
acting upon this knowledge. Action must result from one's
knowledge. Unless the judgment of choice is produced in the
concrete singular, morality is still incomplete. One must
possess prudence in order to act upon the judgment of choice.
We have discovered that there is more to morality than mere
cognitive activity.
As the practical intellect deals with particulars, we
find that the conclusions of the practical syllogism do not
possess the same necessity found in the speculative
syllogism.
The practical reason . . . is concerned with
contingent matters, which is the domain of human
actions; and, consequently, although there is
necessity in he common principles, the more we
descend to the particular, the more frequently we
encounter defects (la. 78,1).
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And again
Therefore when a science approaches closer to
singulars, as operative sciences like medicine,
alchemy, and moral, they can have less certitude
both because of the large numbers of things which
must be considered in the sciences, (if one is
omitted, often error creeps in), and because of
their variability (In De Trin. VI,1).
The value of the common universal principles of the natural
law are not in question here; rather, the issue is how to
take into account the variability of practical science when
it introduces the singular element?
Thomas provides a ready example using the principle
that one should "Return borrowed items."
Thus, it is right and true for all to act according
to reason, and from this principle it follows, as a
proper conclusion, that goods entrusted to another
should be restored to their owner. But it may
happen in a particular case that it would be
injurious, and therefore unreasonable, to restore
goods held in trust; for instance, if they are
claimed for the purpose of fighting against one's
country (1a2ae. 94,4).
A person has lent a weapon to you, but wants it returned for
the purpose of using it in an insurrection against the state.
Our practical syllogism might look as follows.
Major: The Good should be pursued
Minor: Returning borrowed items is good.
CONC: I should return this borrowed item.
But as Thomas points out, to return the item to its owner is
unreasonable. The conclusion is unreasonable for two primary
reasons.
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The conclusion is unreasonable in one respect because
reason has failed Co take account of the relevant
circumstances regarding who is involved, what the action is,
why the action is taking place, when the action occurs, etc.
These reflections recall the statement that when we are
dealing with a practical science, the more we descend to the
particulars the less certain we are of our conclusions.
In addition, the syllogism has confused primary and
secondary precepts of the natural law, and so the conclusion
is unreasonable in another sense. A primary precept of the
natural law is that justice must always be done. This
precept admits of absolutely no exceptions. However, if we
consider the precept to return borrowed items, we discover
that this is a secondary precept and only holds true most of
the time. When one considers the secondary precepts of the
natural law, one finds that individuals may be mistaken
regarding the relevant knowledge available and the rectitude
of the law's application. In the case where one mistakenly
concludes that the borrowed item should be returned, one may
fail to know that this is a wrong conclusion and one will not
be correct in the application of this principle.
We must say that the natural law, as to the first
common principles, is the same for all, both as to
rectitude and as to knowledge. But as to certain
more particular aspects, which are conclusions, as
it were, of those common principles, it is the same
for all in the majority of cases . . . and yet in
some few cases it may fail, both as to rectitude
and knowledge (1a2ae. 94,4).
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In the unreasonable practical syllogism above, these two
types of precepts have not been understood properly. But
even a correct syllogism is not enough for a moral agent to
be considered virtuous.
A virtuous character is required for moral behavior.
One must not only know the correct thing to be done, one must
act upon one's knowledge. Thomas claims that moral science
by itself does not make the agent moral. It needs to be
complemented by prudence.
Prudence means more than moral science. What
pertains to practical science is a universal
judgment concerning matters of action: for
instance, that fornication is evil, that one should
not steal, and the like. Even where this science is
present, it is possible for the rational judgment
to be impeded in the particular act, so that a
right judgment is not made. For this reason, [moral
science without prudence] is said to be of little
value to virtue, for even where it is present man
may sin against virtue (On the Virtues in General 
VI,ad1).
Moral science can tell us what to do in general, but it is
not result in the agent applying the truth of the conclusion
of his syllogism to any real situation encountered by the
agent. As a science, moral science is a speculative virtue.
Prudence, on the other hand, is a practical, and a moral,
virtue.
Moral science considers the good under the formality of
truth. That is, moral science affirms that certain actions
are good actions. But moral science does not prompt action
on the part of the moral agent. For example, moral science
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is able to determine that any given act of adultery is wrong.
Yet, moral science does not apply the truth of this statement
to the agent's real situation. Prudence, on the other hand,
requires that an agent act on his knowledge of the good. It
is "right practical knowledge as immediately regulative of
action," according to Maritain.5
In this chapter we have seen that the first principles
of any type of science are grasped by the understanding as
self-evident. Furthermore, these first principles serve as
the foundation for all subsequent knowledge, i.e. all
demonstrated knowledge.
The reasoning process of the practical intellect
parallels that of the speculative intellect. As being is the
proper object of the speculative intellect, the good is the
proper object of the practical intellect. All subsequent
knowledge is based on these primary concepts found in the
intellect. Speculative truth consists in one's knowing about
a given subject, while practical truth consists in the
capacity to act on the basis of the knowledge of the
principles of practical reason. In the speculative realm,
all knowledge regarding non-operables is based on the
principle of non-contradiction. In the practical realm, all
knowledge concerning operables is derived from the natural
law.
The modes of demonstration in each science will vary
with the subject matter. Speculative sciences will
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demonstrate with a good deal more certainty than the
practical sciences. In the speculative sciences we reason
concerning universal necessary principles, while in the
practical sciences we are dealing with contingent singular
matters.
The practical syllogism is utilized to determine
whether the act in question is permissible. However, much of
the time contingent circumstances alter the nature of the act
so much that the practical syllogism is rendered useless- or
previous practical syllogisms suited to another context.
For the moral agent, practical science is limited in
its scope because it does not issue in action, but is merely
knowledge of the good that should be done. Moral science
simply considers the conclusion of a practical syllogism
under the formality of truth, not as a good that should
actually be pursued by the agent. The agent may fail to act
on the conclusion of the practical syllogism due to
inordinate passion or malice. Knowledge of the good that
should be pursued is not sufficient for a virtuous character.
The moral agent must have the capacity not only to think
correctly about the morality of any given situation, he must
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CHAPTER 3
THE MORAL ACT
Thus far, we have seen that humans act for ends. Their
actions are rationally ordered and deliberative. While
knowledge is clearly necessary for virtue, we find that in
itself it insufficient for virtue.
In this chapter we will first discuss the limitations
on free human action. Secondly, we will discuss the process
of the human act. And finally, we will consider goodness and
evil in the human act.
What do we mean when we talk about human action? As we
have seen, the salient elements of humans is their
rationality. However, for Thomas, rationality includes the
idea of volition, of an ability to choose.
As Damascene observes, man is said to be made in
the image of God, "image in this context
signifying an intellectual being who is free to
judge what he shall do and has the power to act or
not to act (1a2ae. Prologue).
In other words, man is capable of choosing something because
he has the capacity to reason, the question is to grasp how
this occurs (1a2ae. 6).
A first approach is to distinguish between voluntary,
involuntary and nonvoluntary action (In Ethic. III, 1-4).
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Voluntary actions are those that are performed with the
relevant knowledge of the act and the freedom of the will.
An action that lacks either element is not a voluntary
action. Actions performed in ignorance or under coercion are
not properly voluntary actions.
Some involuntary actions are coerced by an extrinsic
principle. Coercion occurs when an individual is forced to
perform an act against one's will. But the act of the will
may be considered in two ways. We may talk of the "elicited
act of the will" or the "act commanded by the will" (1a2ae.
6,4). The elicited act of the will is the will's act of
inclining towards a perceived good, the will's desire for a
good. The commanded act of the will, on the other hand, is
the will's capacity to act in an efficient manner whereby
other powers are moved to act. The elicited act of the will
cannot be coerced by an external principle. No one can force
me to desire something that I do not want to desire.
However, the commanded act of the will may be coerced by
external influence. I may desire, for my summer vacation, to
drive across the continent. This initial desire is an
elicited act of tne will. However, I may be prevented from
doing so for a number of reasons. My car may not work
properly. I might not have the money to do so. I may be
abducted and held for ransom. Any of these causes may result
in the failure of the commanded act of the will. An external
cause has forced me into a situation that I did not desire.
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So, when we talk about the will being coerced, we must always
refer to the commanded act of the will, and not the elicited
act of the will.
There exists one final class of actions that have not
yet been discussed. These are nonvoluntary acts.
Nonvoluntary acts are those that come about due to a lack of
knowledge on the part of the agent. Yet, the agent is not
responsible for the act in question. A ready example is
provided by Damascene.
In the example given above, a man did want to kill
his enemy, yet he killed him in ignorance, thinking
he was killing a deer. Such ignorance does not make
an act involuntary . . . because it does not cause
anything contrary to the will: but it does make the
act non-voluntary, since what is unknown cannot be
actually willed (1a2ae. 6,8).
If the agent could not have prevented his ignorance, his act
was properly nonvoluntary.
A problem crops up concerning the kind of knowledge
that one responsible for. Thomas notes that there are three
types of ignorance: concomitant, consequent, and antecedent.
Concomitant ignorance is present with nonvoluntary action
(1a2ae. 6,8). For example, a man out hunting shoots what he
thinks is deer, but it turns out to be his enemy. In this
case, the hunter is not responsible for killing his enemy,
yet he is pleased with the outcome. Thus, even if he had the
knowledge that it was not his enemy and not a deer that he
was aiming at, the hunter would have shot anyway. Therefore,
we cannot praise the hunter, nor can he take credit, for his
47
action, as it was not a voluntary act.
Consequent ignorance is a voluntary type of ignorance
(1a2ae. 6,8). There are two types of consequent ignorance.
The first type is when the agent simply chooses not to know.
This is called "affected ignorance" according to Thomas. If
a man finds a wallet on the side walk and chooses not to
inquire who the owner is, this is affected consequent
ignorance. The second type of consequent ignorance involves
knowledge that all humans should be aware of (e.g. the
primary precepts of the natural law). Thus, ignorance is no
excuse. A man may not claim that he did not know that murder
was wrong, but he should have known, and thus, his ignorance
does not excuse him of the crime.
The third type of ignorance is known as antecedent
ignorance (1a2ae. 6,8). Antecedent causes an action to be
involuntary. In this case, one is not responsible for
knowing facts that would have altered the course of action.
For instance, if a hunter shoots at what he thinks is a deer
and it turns out to be his favorite dog, the hunter was not
responsible for the act of shooting the dog. For, had he
known, the hunter would not have shot. The agent is
responsible only for those actions that result from a free
will and knowledge of the situation.
To sum up, an action that is voluntary one wherein the
agent has the required knowledge and freedom to act. If
coercion or ignorance are at work the action is not
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voluntary. When the act that results is contrary to the
agent's wishes and is due to either unavoidable ignorance or
coercion, the act is involuntary. When the act that results
is in accordance with the agent's desires but results from
either coercion or ignorance the act is nonvoluntary. While
we have seen that knowledge and free will are essential
components of voluntary action, we have yet to see
specifically how they function in a given moral action.
How do knowledge and free will function in the moral
act? There exists a constant interplay between the acts of
the intellect and the acts of the will according to Thomas's
analysis of the moral act.' There are two acts of the
intellect that bear on the end and there are two acts of the
will that bear on the end. There are two acts of the
intellect and two acts of the will that regard the means to
the end. Finally, there are two acts each of the intellect
and will that bear on the execution of the act. These acts
will be analysed in the order in which the moral agent acts,
We must start with those acts that bear on the end, secondly
we will consider those acts that bear on the means, and
finally we will discuss those acts that bear on the execution
of the act.
The intellect must first apprehend the end as a good
that should be pursued. The intellect presents this good to
the will.
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For the intellect presents the will with its object
and the will causes external action. Consequently,
the intellect, which apprehends something as good
in general, is regarded as being the principle of
the will's movement (1a2ae. 13,5,ad1).
The object must first be known in the intellect before any
action that is properly called moral can possibly take place.
For example, one must first know that helping the needy is a
good that should be pursued before any moral action results.
Secondly, the will must wish for the end. That is, the
end must be desired. This act is simply the rational
appetite for the good in view. Strictly speaking, this act
of the will does not consider intending action toward the
attainment of the end (1a2ae. 8). One simply wishes for the
end, insofar as the end is good. I may wish for a new car
without intending any kind of action that might bring about
the attainment of this end.
Thirdly, the intellect judges whether or not the end in
view is attainable (1a2ae. 12,3). The act of judgment
regards possible objects to be pursued. A human being cannot
pursue the end of becoming a pink elephant or should not
pursue purchasing a car that would absorb all of one's money.
Judgment determines those ends that are and are not
attainable for the agent. If the end in question is
attainable, then the process of the moral act will continue.
The fourth act is intention. This is an act of the
will (1a2ae. 12,1). Intention moves the agent towards the
end in such a way so that one is now considering the end as
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attainable and wishes to act upon this knowledge. Intention
has prompted the individual to deliberate regarding a means
to the end in view. At this point the agent considers how
it is possible to attain the intended end, and this involves
deliberation concerning how one might obtain the end as
intended.
Deliberation is an act of the intellect (1a2ae. 14).
It is an intellectual inquiry that concerns the means to an
end. This inquiry terminates in what one may do immediately.
For example, I may desire an occupation that pays very well.
I realize that I will need an M.B.A. degree. But before I
earn an M.B.A., I will need to graduate from college.
Therefore, I will need to apply to college and this act is
the termination of deliberation. I must apply to a college.
Mnreover, deliberation is a mode of reasoning that proceeds
via resolution. It is a resolutive process because "what is
prior in knowledge (the end) is posterior in being" (1a2ae.
14,6). We move from the complex effects back to their simple
causes. Deliberation is a discursive process that concerns
the suitable means to the end. In the above example, the end
to be attained is a well-paying occupation. This is the
effect that is posterior in being, yet prior in knowledge.
On the other hand, the application to a college is the
termination of deliberation. In resolving the end to its
simple causes, we find that application to college is a
simple cause, conjoined with other simple causes, that will
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bring about the desired end as an effect.
The will must consent to the means arrived at by
deliberation (1a2ae. 15). Consent is the act of the will
regarding the means. It is the "application of the
appetitive :oovowent to the determination of counsel" (1a2ae.
15,6). The will must be able to adopt the means to the end
as determined by deliberation before any further action may
take place.
Following upon consent, we find that the intellect
makes a practical judgment of choice (1a2ae. 16). This
practical judgment mnde by the intellect formally determines
the choice that the will acts upon.
The intellect moves the will in the way in which an
end is said to move-- by conceiving beforehand the
reason for acting and proposing it to the will (On
Truth XXII, 12).
This judgment of choice is the conclusion of the operative
practical syllogism. It is the formal intellectual
determination of the act such as "I should not kill this man"
(On Truth XXIV,2).
The will's act of choice sets into motion the execution
of the moral act. The will adheres to the formal
determination of the intellect as found in the conclusion of
the operative syllogism. This act is known as "election."
Election moves the agent to act. In the order of acts
concerned with the means, election efficiently causes the
action which is formally caused by the intellect.
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To move in the manner of an efficient cause,
however, belongs to the will and not to the
intellect (On Truth XXII,12).
However, the will is also the material cause of the act.
Thomas comments on the relation of the intellect as formal
cause and the will as material cause.
For, whenever there are two principles of motion Or
action with an ordination to each other, that in
the effect which is due to the higher agent is, as
it were formal, and that which is from the lower
agent is, as it were, material. This is clear both
in physical things and moral matters (On Truth
XIV,5).
In the act of choice the will is the material cause of the
act in so far as it is determined in a particular way by the
intellect, the formal cause. The will is also the efficient
cause of the act, as it adheres to the formally determined
decision of the intellect in the actual production of the
act.
The first of the acts concerned with execution is the
intellect's command (imperium). This act issues from reason.
Command is essentially an act of reason, for the
one commanding, by enjoining or by declaring orders
the one who is commanded to do something, and to
order by way of enjoining or declaring belongs to
reason (1a2ae. 17,1).
Command follows upon the act of choice, an act of will.
Furthermore, command must come from reason, as reason is that
faculty by which one orders.
Use follows command. Use is also an act of the will
(1a2ae. 16). It is the efficient cause of the commanded
action, in the order of execution. Thomas explains:
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The use of something implies its application to
some activity, and hence the activity to which we
apply a thing is called its use, just as to go
horseback riding is to make use of a horse, and to
hit is to make use of a stick. Now we apply the
interior principles of action to activity, namely,
the powers of the soul or the members of the body,
for example, the intellect to understanding and the
eye to seeing, as well as external things, such as
the stick for hitting (1a2ae. 16).
From the text, it is clear that use not only applies to
external objects (e.g. sticks) but it also applies to the
internal powers of the soul (e.g. understanding and seeing).
Other things and powers are "used" by the will in the
execution of the commanded act.
The last intellectual step in the moral act is the
attainment of the end. At this point the intellect judges
whether or not the act performed was suitable to the
attainment of the end in question (1a2ae. 11,2). And the
final step of the moral act is the will's enjoyment of the
end as attained. This act is called fruition (1a2ae. 11,2).
The analysis of the process of the moral act considers
the act from a somewhat abstract perspective in the sense
that the act is idealized. Not all actions go according to
an agent's intent. Nor have we specifically considered how
actions might be called good or evil.
In a good action there are four kinds of goodness.
Good actions are such in so far as they (1) have being (2)
are good in themselves (3) have a good end, and (4) take
account of the relevant circumstances.
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A fourfold goodness can be considered in human
action. The first is the goodness an action has in
terms of its genus, namely, as an action, for it
has as much goodness as it has of action and
being...Second, an action has goodness according to
its species, which it has from its appropriate
object. Third, it has goodness from its
circumstances--its accidents, as it were. Fourth,
it has goodness from its end, which is related to
it as a cause of goodness (1a2ae. 18,4).
Each of these types of goodness must be considered more
carefully.
The goodness that an action possesses in so far as it
has being is a generic kind of goodness. The generic
goodness of an action is not strictly moral, but it is good
only in the sense that the act exists, for existence is good.
The notions of being and goodness are convertible terms for
Thomas? Hence, a deficiency in being brings about a
deficiency of goodness.
It should be said that every act as having
something of being has something of goodness, but
insofar as it lacks something of the fullness of
the being a human action ought to have, it lacks
goodness and to this extent is evil, for example if
it lacks the quantity determined by reason, or a
due place, or something of this kind (1a2ae. 18,1).
Thus, every action, whether specifically good or evil, has a
generic element of goodness. An act of fornication is good
in as much as it has being, but lacks the order of reason
(i.e. the act is committed with the wrong person).
Therefore, the generic notion of goodness fails to take
account of the specific determinants of human action. So, in
what specific ways can we say that an act is good?
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The object of the action concerns the type of action
that is being performed. What kind of action is under
consideration? For example, is the act in question an act of
murder or is it an act of capital punishment? The act in
question must be one that is not prohibited by any of the
primary precepts of the natural law. For instance, murder is
always forbidden by a primary precept of the natural law.
The very act of murder is, by definition, an evil act.
The circumstances are of extreme importance, as they
affect the act accidentally (1a2ae. 7). Relevant
circumstances include who is acting, where the act takes
place, how the act is performed, when the act is performed,
the reason for the action, and what is being done (1a2ae.
7,3). The circumstances affect the moral quality of the act.
For example, the circumstance of "where" affects the moral
quality of the act of sexual intercourse. This type of
activity should take place in privacy, as is fitting. The
act is disordered if it takes place in a public arena.
Furthermore, if any relevant circumstance is lacking, the
whole act may be disordered, and thus, an evil act.
The end for which the agent is acting also determines
the moral goodness of the act. One must have a good end in
view for the act to be called good. If one is kind to
another only for the sake of later taking advantage of that
person the act is evil. For an act to be morally good it
must not lack in the object of the act (i.e. in the kind of
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act that it is), the circumstances or the end which is to be
achieved. In sum, all morally good actions are those actions
that are permitted by natural law, performed in the right
circumstances, and for the right reason.
By discussing the ways in which an action may be good,
Thomas implies that there are specific ways in which actions
may be evil. Ignorance, passion and malice are all causes of
evil actions (1a2ae. 76-78). Each of these destroy the
goodness of an act in a different way. In our previous
discussion on the voluntary nature of human action, we found
that ignorance may cause an evil action. This voluntary kind
of ignorance is known as consequent ignorance. That is, the
agent is responsible for having the relevant knowledge of a
given situation. In this way, ignorance is a cause of evil
action where the ignorance itself is willed by the agent
(lalae. 76). Ignorance causes evil in the sense that the
moral act is deficient in terms of knowledge that should be
possessed.
Passion can also cause an evil act. Passion can
influence the will's activity in two ways: by distraction and
by altering the judgment of reason. Passion can distract the
agent
when the movement of the sensitive appetite is
strengthened in respect of any passion whatever,
the proper movement of the rational appetite or
will must, of necessity, become relaxed or
altogether impeded (1a2ae. 77).
The sensitive appetite has the power to distract the will's
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desire to the point that the sensitive good is chosen in
place of a higher good. For example, sexual desire may so
distract an individual so that the individual fails to act
temperately.
Passion may also influence the will by altering the
judgment of reason. That is, the sensory good the sensory
good presented to the will might be emphasized inordinately
to the exclusion of reason choosing the higher good. The
will, then, "has not been offered a proper object of choice."3
In this second case, passion has pre-empted reason's capacity
to choose. In either case, the sensitive appetite can only
indirectly influence the will, as the will is still the
higher power. In the case of passion's influence on the
moral act, we find that the moral act is deficient in the
ordering of the act. The sensitive appetite has usurped the
place of reason.
The final cause of evil is malice (1a2ae. 78). A
malicious act is one where the act of the will itself is
disordered. In this case the person knowingly and freely
chooses a lower good instead of a higher good. This type of
evil action is the most serious of ail.
4
 The malicious will
is not affected by either passicn or ignorance, and thus, the
person is more responsible for his or her own action than in
any other faulty situation. In the case of the malicious
will, order, and goodness, is lacking due to a disordered
will. The act is deficient due to the knowing and voluntary
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action of the will.
Good and evil actions do not take place in isolated
incidents. Rather, they are best viewed as springing forth
from the character of a given agent. We expect bad people to
act consistently in evil ways; we expect good people to act
consistently in morally good ways. This brings to light the
fact that a moral act does not exist in isolation from all
other moral acts. rather, morality is a matter of habitually
doing good things and habitually doing evil things. This
topic of habit is the subject of the next chapter.
In this chapter we have seen that human action involves
the agent's knowledge of the situation and his ability to
exert his will freely in attaining his purpose. If the
action lacks either knowledge or freedom, the act may not be
called moral. However, certain types of ignorance do enter
the picture. If one willingly chooses not to inquire into a
situation when one should, then the act does take on moral
dimensions, and is an evil action.
The moral act involves an interplay between the
faculties of the intellect, as cognitive, and the will, as
volitional. These acts regard the end in question, the means
to the end, and the execution of the act intended to achieve
the end.
An action may be found to be lacking goodness in three
specifically moral ways. The act itself may be evil. The
circumstances relating to the act in question may be lacking
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a due order. The end in view may be an evil end. Actions
are evil in as much as they involve either willed ignorance,
inordinate passion, or malice.
NOTES
1. Bourke, Ethics, 64 gives a "Table of Steps" that
explicitly shows the cFronological order, and relation, of
the steps of the will and intellect in the moral act.
INTELLECT WILL
In I.Apprehension of end II.Wishing the end
Regard
to End III.Judgment of IV.Intention of end
attainability
In V.Deliberation on VI.Consent to means
Regard means
to
Means VII.Judgment of Choice VIII.Choice
In IX.Command X.Use
Regard
to XI.Apprehension of XII.Fruition
Execu- Suitability
tion
2. At la2ae. 18,1 Thomas expands on the idea that
"good" and "being" are convertible terms. "We must speak of
good and evil in actions the way we do of good and evil in
things, for a thing produces the kind of action it does
because of the kind of thing it is. Now with respect to
things, each thing has as much good as it has being, for good
and being are convertible. . . some things may have being
in some respect and yet lack something of the fullness of
being they ought to have. For example, the fullness of a
human being requires the composite of soul and body, having
all the powers and instruments of knowledge and motion; hence
if a man lacks any of these he lacks something of the
fullness of his being."
3. Bourke, Ethics, 275.
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4. Etienne Gilson, Moral Values and the Moral Life,




In this chapter we move to consider the principles of
patterned human behavior: habit and virtue. These principles
are acquired by the soul in the development of an
individual's character. Virtue is a good habit of the soul.
As such, it shares common characteristics with other habits,
but also possesses certain unique elements. Therefore, we
will begin by examining the nature of habit, an acquired
disposition of the soul. Secondly, we will consider the
elements unique to virtue. And, finally, we will investigate
in detail the various kinds of virtues.
In his discussion of habit, Thomas draws upon
Aristotle's teaching. "A habit is a disposition, or a
quality, of the soul, " according to Thomas.(1a2ae. 57) The
root idea of the concept is "to have"(1a2ae. 49,3). He
states that
The Philosopher says,"'havine or 'habit' means a
disposition by which that which is disposed is
either well or ill disposed, either in itself or
with reference to something else (1a2ae. 49,4).
This type of quality is one that is acquired by an
individual. This acquired disposition may be either a good
disposition (i.e. virtue) or an evil disposition (i.e. vice).
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But how is a habit "disposed" to something?
A habit is a disposition that is ordered to an act, a
quality of the soul that enables an agent to perform an
action with relative ease. For a habit to be disposed to an
action it must possess three elements (1a2ae. 49,4). First,
the habit must be distinct from the action that is performed
under its influence.
That which is disposed must be distinct from that
to which it is disposed, and thus related to it as
potentiality to act (1a2ae. 49,4).
This first condition brings an important point to light. A
being that is pure act has no need of habit. Only those
beings that are a combination of potency and act have need
for habits. Thus, habits are necessary for humans but not
for God, as God is pure act. The human being, in order to
attain goods proper to his nature, must make use of habits.
In a second way, the agent must be determined to
various objects in various ways. If a thing were in potency
only to one object then there would be no need for a habit.
However,
that which is in potency to something must be able
to be determined in several ways and to different
things (1a2ae. 49,4).
There is an element of indeterminateness in human affairs
such that any individual is not necessarily determined to act
in one way. Determinism prevails in those entities that are
disposed to only one kind of activity. But humans are
disposed to a variety of activities (e.g. eating, drinking
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and thinking).
Thirdly, the various powers residing in the subject
must "concur in order to dispose the subject to one of the
things to which it is in potency" (1a2ae. 49,4). A human
being is a unity having vegetative, sensitive, and
intellectual powers. These elements must function together
in order to gain their various goods (e.g. food, drink,
living together with other humans). A habit proportions, or
harmonizes, the various elements of the soul with the result
that they function well together. But what parts are there
to the human soul that need to be disposed to activity?
A habit perfects that part of the soul which is ordered
to a particular activity (1a2ae. 49,2). However, as the
human being is a composite of body and soul we find that
there are at least three possible ways that the soul could be
ordered to an act: vegetatively, sensitively, or
intellectually (1a2ae. 50,2).
Human habits relate precisely to those vegetative,
sensitive and intellectual powers of the human soul. Each
power has specific functions, so one can consider each power
as related to the soul's various goods. The nutritive soul
has no habits as it does not respond to the dictates of
reason.
The powers of the nutritive part of the soul do not
have an innate aptitude for obeying the command of
reason, and hence there are no habits in them. But
the sense powers do have an innate aptitude to obey
the command of reason, and hence there can be
64
habits in them, for insofar as they follow reason
they are said to be rational in a certain respect
(1a2ae. 50,3).
The nutritive powers of the soul are distinguished from the
sensitive by noting that while the nutritive power does not
respond to the commands of reason, the sensitive power does
to a degree. The oxygenation of the blood is beyond the
control of human reason, as this process belongs to the
nutritive soul. On the other hand, the appetite of hunger
can, and should, be regulated by reason. An individual may
feel the urge to eat, but one has the power to decide how
much and what kind of food is suitable.
The sensitive soul has two primary appetites: the
irascible and the concupiscible appetites (la. 81,2). These
appetites are the source of inclinations. They may be
distinguished by noting that the irascible appetite enables
one to pursue difficult goods resolutely, while the
concupiscible appetite inclines one to pursue easy goods and
avoid pains.
Since the sensitive appetite is an inclination...
there must needs be in the sensitive part two
appetitive powers: one, through which the soul is
inclined absolutely to seek what is suitable,
according to the senses, and to fly from what is
hurtful, and this is called concupiscible; and
another, whereby an animal resists the attacks that
hinder what is suitable, and inflict harm, and this
is called irascible (la. 81,2).
We might say that the concupiscible appetite seeks the "easy
goods" of food, drink, and sex. On the other hand, the
irascible appetite seeks to fight against difficult goods by
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trying to "counteract the passions of the concupiscible
appetite" (la. 81,2).
We can also look at the appetites in a different way.
The irascible and concupiscible appetites can be
distinguished by their proper objects. The object of the
concupiscible appetite is the "pleasurable or the painful"
(1a2ae. 21,1). The concupiscible appetite pursues pleasures
and avoids pains that are easily obtained or avoided. The
irascible appetite has for its proper object "a sense-good or
sense-evil qua arduous, i.e. in so far as the acquisition or
avoidance involves some kind of difficulty or struggle"
(1a2ae. 23,1). The irascible appetite must struggle in order
to obtain pleasures and goods.
As we move on to consider the intellectual part of the
soul, we discover that the appetite of the intellectual part
of the soul is the will (1a2ae. 8,1). Thomas says
the will is a rational appetite. Now an appetite is
only for the good. The reason for this is that
appetite is simply an inclination for something on
the part of the one who desires it. Now nothing is
favorably disposed to something unless it is like
or suitable to it (1a2ae. 8,1).
The intellectual appetite, known as the will, inclines toward
the good, or at least the perceived good (1a2ae. 8,1). The
will, as residing in reason, also rules over the other
appetites (i.e. over the irascible and concupiscible). The
will is a higher power; it tends towards the greater, or more
universal good. The sensitive appetites, on the other hand,
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tend towards only the particular good (1a2ae. 9,2). Thus,
there exist two principles of human action: appetite and
reason itself.
The intellect also has non-appetitive habits. Since
the intellect is an operative power in its own right, as
distinct from will, it has the capacity to perform purely
intellectual acts. Thus, there is a habit of first
principles, a habit of demonstrative knowledge from first
principles to conclusions, and a habit of reasoning from
effects back to the first cause of being. These intellectual
habits reside in the passive intellect (1a2ae. 50,4). The
intellectual habits, as they are formed in the passive
intellect, are responsible for the soul's grasping reality as
presented to the intellect.
Habits are caused by repetition. They are efficiently
caused by conscious, deliberate repetition. They may be
increased or diminished after they have been acquired.
Therefore, it can be said that "with repeated acts a habit
grows" (1a2ae. 52,3). But to what are the various habits, as
acquired dispositions, ordered to?
The various habits may be distinguished by their
objects. That is, they are differentiated in terms of the
end of their operations. The ends of sensitive habits are
differentiated from the intellectual as they have different
purposes. The intellectual habits direct man towards
contemplation while the sensitive habits direct man to goods
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in accordance with his sensitive nature.
Habits can be distinguished in terms of their active
principle. Intellectual habits are distinct from sensitive
habits, because the active principles of the intellect and
the sensitive appetites are distinct. The active principles
of the intellectual nature are the will and reason while the
active principle of the sensitive nature are the irascible
and concupiscible appetites.
Habits are also properly distinguished in terms of
their nature. This can mean two different things. In one
sense the nature of a habit can be either a good habit or a
had habit. Good habits are known as virtues and bad habits
are known as vices. If the habit is suitable to a being's
nature as perfective of that being, then this habit is a
virtue. However, if the habit is not perfective of that
being's nature, then it is a vice.
But the "nature" of habit may have a second meaning.
If one considers the higher and lower elements of the soul,
then the habits will have different natures. Man has a
nature that concerns his natural ends (i.e. knowing truth,
begetting children, etc.) However, man also has a
supernatural end (i.e. the beatific vision). Therefore,
while there exist habits of the lower nature (e.g.
temperance) that enable him to live well according to his
nature as rational animal, there are also habits of a higher
nature (e.g. charity) that assist him in the attainment of
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his supernatural end. But the first distinction between good
and evil habits is clearly what concerns our discussion, as
we are not going to delve into the theological virtues.
Therefore, the next step in our discussion must be to analyze
the nature of those good habits that enable man to live well
in this life according to his natural ends.
Virtue is a good habit of an operative power of the
human soul. Virtue, therefore, is the further specification
of habit. Virtue can be considered in terms of its four
causes.
For the formal cause of virtue, as of anything, is
taken from its genus, and difference, when it is
defined as "a good quality," for the genus of
virtue is quality and the difference is good. But
the definition would be more appropriate if in
place of quality, we use habit . . . the subject is
given in place of the material cause when it is
said that a virtue is a good quality of the mind. .
. . Now the end of virtue is . . . operation. . • •
(Me distinction of virtue from habits which are
related sometimes to good and at other times to
evil is expressed by "of which no one can make bad
use" (1a2ae. 55,4).
And the efficient cause of moral virtue is acquired by
repeated actions.'
Human virtue, as ordered to the good which is
measured by the rule of human reason, can be caused
by human acts insofar as acts of such virtue
proceed from reason, under whose power and rule
such good is established (1a2ae. 63,2).
Generically speaking, virtue is a habit of the soul.
Specifically, it is a good habit. When the genus and species
of a thing are given, the formal cause is known. Therefore,
the formal cause of virtue is its genus and species, a good
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habit.
Materially, it seems that there is no substance "out of
which" virtue is formed. Therefore, the material cause of
virtue is replaced by the subject of virtue. Virtue has only
a subject "about which" it is concerned, the human soul.
The final cause of virtue is right living. A virtue
can never be misused. Virtue is ordered to behavior that
perfects an operative power of the soul. This end, or good,
is correct action.
The efficient cause of human virtue is repeated action.
Virtue is acquired by the agent performing repeated moral
actions. The repetition grows into an acquired disposition
and the virtue is formed efficiently in this manner.
The subject of virtue is the operative potency of the
human soul. As the soul has certain powers, there will be
virtues that correspond to those powers. "Virtue belongs to
a power of the soul" (1a2ae. 56,1). There are three reasons
why the subject of virtue is a power of the soul.
First, because of the very nature of virtue, which
implies the perfection of a power, and a perfection
is in that of which it is a perfection. Second,
from the fact that virtue is an operative habit, as
we have said, and every operation comes from the
soul through some power. Third, from the fact that
virtue disposes to what is best, and the best is
the end, which is either a thing's operation or
something acquired by an operation proceeding from
the power (1a2ae. 56,1).
As humans are in potency to various and indeterminate objects
they need good habits in order to obtain these objects. For
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example, these objects to be obtained included orderly family
and social life, and proper contemplation of truth. Now,
humans possess various powers that when enacted attain these
objects. Therefore, as virtue is a perfection of a power
that human's posscss, virtue must concern a power of the
human soul. Secondly, powers are ordered to operations.
Furthermore, habits concerns operations of these powers.
Therefore, good habits concern powers ordered to operation.
Thirdly, virtue is a disposition to good operation. And this
good operation regards a good end. Consequently, virtue must
concern a power of the soul. But the question is what are
the powers of the soul?
The virtues that concern the cognitive intellectual
capacities of the agent are known as the intellectual
virtues. These virtues will be the perfection of the
operations of the passive intellect. These operative habits
may concern non-operables or operables. Therefore, the
speculative intellectual virtues include wisdom,
understanding and science, while the practical intellectual
virtues include prudence and art.
Understanding serves as a key analogue for Thomas's
account of practical reason. Understanding is "the habit of
first principles" (1a2ae. 57,2). Understanding grasps the
truth as it is "known in itself" (1a2ae. 57,2) For instance,
it is the understanding that grasps the principles "A being
cannot be and not be at the same time" and "The good is to be
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pursued and evil avoided." The understanding grasps these
first principles of demonstration without knowing the ways
they are employed in the various sciences.
The virtue of understanding perfects the intellect in
two primary ways. In one way, understanding provides the
intellect with the capacity to know indemonstrable truths in
themselves. In a second way, understanding perfects the
intellect in that it is a specific mode of knowing. It knows
truth immediately, not by means of other truth.
Understanding is a habit in a different sense than the
other virtues which are called "habits." Usually, virtue
requires a considerable amount of repetition. Not so with
understanding. The virtue of understanding is partly innate
and partly acquired, as has been noted above.
As is the case with all the intellectual virtues, the
subject of understanding is the possible intellect.
Understanding is a perfection of the passive intellect
insofar as the passive intellect receives the intelligible
forms as given by the agency of the active intellect.
However, these first principles are not limited exclusively
to the realm of speculation.
Science is the habit of mediated knowledge. It
concerns truth that is "understood by the intellect, not at
once, but by means of the reasons's inquiry" (1a2ae. 57,2).
Thomas clarifies this notion by stating that
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In regard to that which is last in this or that
genus of knowable truths, it is science that
perfects the intellect. Therefore, according to the
diverse genera of knowable truths, there are
diverse habits of the sciences (1a2ae. 57,2).
Furthermore, the intellect is
perfected by a habit through which conclusions
demonstrated from such principles are known.
Demonstration may proceed from inferior causes, as
in sciences or from the highest cause" (In De Trin. 
V,1).
Science is a "habit of conclusions."2 As such a habit,
it presupposes the first principles of understanding. As the
first principles of the understanding will concern
speculative and practical matters, science will also concern
speculative matters as well as practical matters. Two of the
major branches of speculative sciences are mathematics and
natural science. One of the major practical sciences is
moral science.
As science is mediated knowledge, it does not grasp
truth immediately, but proceeds by a discursive process, that
terminates in a conclusion. In this way it perfects the
passive intellect. However, there is another type of
reasoning process that also perfects the passive intellect,
but this habit concerns the "highest cause." This special
type of science is called 
"wisdom.“
Wisdom is that habit of the speculative intellect that
"considers the highest causes . . it rightly judges and
orders all truths, because there can be no perfect and
universal judgment except by resolution to first causes”
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(1a2ae. 57,2). Wisdom is the habit of the intellect's
inquiry into first causes by way of resolution (e.g. the five
ways of demonstrating God's existence). Furthermore, it
judges and orders all truths, and in this respect it stands
over and above the various types of sciences.
Wisdom is the highest of all the speculative
intellectual virtues due to the nature of its object. It
perfects the passive intellect in demonstrating first causes.
However, wisdom is distinct from the virtue of science in two
special ways.
First, wisdom has the highest authority over all of the
other sciences. Other sciences are judged by the truths of
wisdom. The wise individual knows that the truths of the
first causes of being are the most fundamental. The
recognition of these truths organizes and provides the
structure for the demonstrated truths of the sciences. If
there is a conflict between the two bodies of knowledge (i.e.
science and wisdom), the truths of wisdom always have
priority as their object is the highest of all possible
causes (i.e. being itself). "For whatever is found in the
other sciences contrary to the truth of this science (i.e.
wisdom) miust be condemned as false" (la. 1,6,ad2).
Second, wisdom has the greatest certainty of all
demonstrated knowledge. It has the greatest certainty
because its proper object is the first cause of all being in
that it resolves all effects to their first cause i.e. God.
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Therefore,
The wise man knows that things have been made and
ordered by God, and that, as a consequence, things
are hierarchized by their relations to their
Ultimate End Who is God (la. 14,1,ad2).
Wisdom considers being as such. It transcends natural
science and mathematics and deals solely with the object of
metaphysics, i.e. being itself. Commenting on wisdom's
function, Sr. Brennan notes that wisdom facilitates "the
speculative intellect in those operations by which it
considers the objects proper to the realm of metaphysics,
that is, those of the third degree of abstraction. - Wisdom
does not deal with quantitative being, or material being, but
with being qua being.
However, the intellect does not merely contemplate
speculative truths, it also contemplates operables that can
be made or performed by the agent. There are two practical
intellectual virtues: art and prudence.
Art is initially defined as "right reasoning about
certain works to be made" (1a2ae. 57,3). Art differs from
the speculative virtues in that art concerns products that
can be made by the individual. The agent is viewed as an
"active artisan, not as the spectator or rapt contemplator of
beauty.” 4 
Art is the habit of producing various artifacts
according to right reason. One must reason correctly in the
production of an external object. The carpenter must reason
rightly about the construction of a table. He must possess
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the habit of art in order to produce a good table. The habit
of art concerns the truth of things that can be produced by
the agent. This kind of truth is practical and, thus, it
will vary according to the circumstances.
Art is a virtue that perfects the passive intellect in
two ways. First, it fosters the capacity for the mind to to
operate immanently in production of various things. It
enables the artist to produce his work according to the
formal element of right reason that must precede his
creation. Second, art directs the transient activity of the
actual production of the artifact in question.
The purpose of art is to create a good artifact. The
artist attempts to create a product that will fulfill its
function. The carpenter desires to create a table that will
support objects laid upon it. Bad art is a result of defect.
That is, a bad table will not do what it was designed to do.
The good, then, of art is to be found primarily in the
artifact, not in the agent. Art is concerned with exterior
matter. "Making and doing differ in that making is an
activity having an effect on exterior matter" (1a2ae. 57,4).
Therefore, one does not need to possess a good will in order
to be a good artist. A good carpenter may still be a very
evil person.
The virtue that enables one to act well is the domain
of prudence. Prudence is the last of the intellectual
virtues. However, its function is of the greatest
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significance as far as the moral life is concerned. Prudence
is a unique virtue in that it functions both as an
intellectual virtue and as a moral virtue. Essentially
prudence is an intellectual virtue, but its subject matter is
that of moral virtue. Thus, prudence "welds together, as it
were, the moral and intellectual life of man . . . and is in
many respects, the key virtue of them all," according to Sr.
Brennan.
5
Prudence is defined as "right reasoning about what is
to be done" (1a2ae. 57,4). This practical intellectual
virtue differs from art in that prudence concerns actions,
not production of things.
Making and doing differ in that making is an
activity having an effect on exterior matter, such
as building, sawing, and the like, while doing is
an activity remaining within the agent, such as
seeing, willing, and the like (1a2ae. 57,4).
In other words art differs from prudence in that prudence is
an activity that remains "within the agent," while art
concerns "exterior matter." However, prudence and art both
concern the habitual capacity to intellectually think through
an operation.
The operation prudence is directed towards concerns
right action. Its object is morally good behavior.
Moreover, this kind of behavior is not limited to isolated
areas of one's life, but is comprehensive in the sense that
it concerns the entire moral life of the individual.
Prudence regards deliberation "about matters pertaining to
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the whole of human life and the ultimate end of human life"
(1a2ae. 57,4,ad3).
Prudence is not merely concerned with right action in
the abstract, but with what route of action must be taken
now. The perfection of the practical intellect is always
directed, ultimately, to action. Therefore, prudence will
not consist of mere speculation about good behavior; rather
it will facilitate the capacity to act here and now.
In sum, in this chapter we have shown that habits are
acquired dispositions of the soul that facilitate human
action. Habits are necessary for humans as the human agent
is in potency to a variety of activities corresponding to the
various powers of the human soul.
Good habits which reside in the soul are virtues. They
are always directed toward good opertation and acquired by
repetition.
The powers of the soul that are the subjects of the
virtues include reason, the will, and the sensitive
appetites. Those good habits that perfect the rational
powers of the soul are known as intellectual virtues.
Understanding, science and wisdom are speculative
intellectual virtues. On the other hand, art and prudence
are practical intellectual virtues. Art deals with the
making of things. Prudence concerns right reasoning
concerning human actions. Human actions involve not only
intellectual habits, but the ordering of one's appetites as
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well. Morally good action requires the possession of the
cardinal, or moral, virtues.
NOTES
1. In the text quoted from St. Augustine, the type of
virtue described is theological virtue. The efficient cause
of theological virtue is divine agency. The human agent
cannot acquire theological virtue without the direct infused
activity of God.
2. Sr. Rose Emmanuella Brennan, The Intellectual
Virtues According to the Philosophy 6T- St. Thomas,





PRUDENCE AND MORAL VIRTUE
Prudence has the unique position of being both an
intellectual as well as a moral virtue. Prudence is
essentially an intellectual virtue, but its subject matter is
moral. In the last chapter we observed the intellectual
nature of prudence. In this chapter we will investigate the
notion of right reason and how right reason functions with
prudence in moral virtue.
Prudence is defined as "right reason about things to be
done" (recta ratio agibilium). Hence, we shall first giv2 a
brief account of right reason. Secondly, we will note why
prudence requires the possession of the other moral virtues.
Thirdly, we will give a detailed account of the virtual and
component parts of prudence. And finally, we will see how
prudence perfects the practical intellect.
The notion of right reason is net unique to prudence.
The intellectual virtues of science and art are also defined
in terms of right reason. Science, according to Thomas, is
right reason in conclusions to be drawn" (recta ratio
scibilium) (2a2ae. 55). Art, on the other hand, is "right
reason about things to be made" (recta ratio factibilium)






with right reason. There must be more to the
than the generic notion of right reason (1a2ae.
Consequently, although moral virtue is not right
reason, as Socrates maintained, neither is it only
being in accord with right reason, inasmuch as it
inclines one to what is in accord with right
reason, as the Platonists held, but it must also be
present with right reason, as Aristotle says
(1a2ae. 58,4,ad3).
Prudence is specifically different from science and art
in that prudence concerns things to be done, not
to be drawn or things to be made. But one
conclusions
who is able to
draw conclusions well need not be virtuous. The same applies
to the artist. However, the prudent character requires that
one possess moral virtue
science do not require the
prudence does. But why is
In order to fully
(1a2ae. 57,4). Thus, art and
possession of moral virtue while
this?
understand Thomas at this very
critical point we must recall that first principles function
in the practical intellect in a parallel fashion to the first
principles in the speculative intellect. Yet, there is a
crucial difference. In the practical intellect, one's




explains these points in a key
All other intellectual virtues can exist
without moral virtue, but there cannot be prudence
without moral virtue. The reason for this is that
prudence is right reasoning about what is to be
done-- and this not only in general, but also in
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particular, in respect to which man acts. Now right
reasoning requires principles from which the
reasoning proceeds. And reasoning about particulars
must proceed not only from universal principles but
from particular principles as well. As to universal
principles about things to be done, man is rightly
disposed by the natural understanding of
principles, whereby he recognizes that no evil
thing is to be done; or again by some practical
science. But this is not enough for right reasoning
about particular cases. For it sometimes happens
that such a universal principle known by
understanding or through some science, is perverted
in a particular case by some passion; for example,
to a person very desirous of something when the
desire overcomes him, the object seems good to him,
although it is contrary to the universal judgment
of his reason (1a2ae. 58,5).
Prudence is concerned with particular cases. One always acts
in a singular instance. However, there must be universal
principles to which we can refer our behavior. These
universal principles are supplied by the natural law.
However, these singular cases also utilize particular
principles. The problem is that in reasoning from the
universal principle to the particular act of command,
sometimes one is overwhelmed by passion to the extent that
one does an evil act. For example, one may know that all
acts of adultery are evils to be avoided. Yet, one may
commit an act of adultery when under the influence of
passion. So, how is it possible to act virtuously?
We must recall that that it is possible to possess all
of the intellectual virtues without possessing the moral
virtues, except in the case of prudence. Prudence requires
the possession of moral virtue. If one did not possess moral
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virtue, one would only be able to think about morality, one
would not be able to act. Thus, it becomes clear that
prudence requires that the agent must have right thinking as
well as a right appetite if one is to be called prudent. One
must acquire the right appetitive disposition.
Consequently, just as a man is disposed rightly to
universal principles by natural understanding or by
the habit of science, so in order to be rightly
disposed with regard to particular principles
concerning things to be done, which are as ends or
goals, he must be perf2cted by certain habits, so
that it becomes connatural, as it were, to him to
judge rightly about an end. This comes about
through moral virtue, for the virtuous person
judges about the end rightly, since "such as a man
is, so does the end seem to him." Hence in order to
reason rightly about what is to be done, which is
prudence, man must have moral virtue (1a2ae. 58,5).
The person who has a rightly ordered appetite also possesses
what Thomas calls "connatural knowledge" (2a2ae. 45,2). The
meaning of this term is "knowledge in accord with nature."
When applied to virtue it carries with it the idea that one
acquires a second nature.
The area where connatural knowledge plays its most
important role is the affective part of the soul. Moral
virtue is a connatural disposition of one's appetite.
Moreover, this disposition affects the judgment of reason
either positively when one judges rightly or negatively when
one judges wrongly. The meaning of the phrase "as a man is
so does the end seems to him," becomes clearer. The
condition of one's appetite will affect the moral judgments
one makes.
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The suitability of an object is recognized much
more often through concrete reactions of the
appetite, by way of inclination, than through
purely rational and cold knowledge:
One's inclination to various objects of appetite are
modified, either intensifying or attenuating, by the virtues
or vices.
One may possess moral knowledge in two ways according
to Thomas (2a2ae. 45,2). In one way, one may know a moral
truth per modem cognitionis. In this case, one knows a moral
truth in an impersonal way, by doing moral science. One may
obtain a moral truth without actually experiencing it
oneself. The moral philosopher may be able to render advice
concerning chastity without having experiential knowledge of
the issue. However, one may know moral truths per modem
inclinationis. In this second way one knows a moral truth by
means of his experience of it. Thus, one may ask the chaste
individual questions concerning chastity and the virtuous
person will tender advice gained from experience via per 
modem inclinationis. "One does not need a moral theory in
order to be good and one can have a moral theory without
being good," as Mclnerny observes!
Prudence is primary among the virtues. It is the
"mother and mold of the other moral virtues," as Pieper
claims? Thomas observes that "For what is proper to
prudence overflows into the other virtues insofar as they are
directed by prudence" (1a2ae. 61,4,ad1). Thus, if one
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possesses any of the other moral virtues: justice, fortitude
and temperance one must possess prudence. Prudence,
therefore, charges all good human conduct with right reason.
Conversely, "Every sin conflicts with prudence, as every
virtue is charged with prudence" (2a2ae. 55). Let us take a
brief look at how prudence operates in the other moral
virtues.
Justice can be defined as right reason in relation to
others. Justice has to do with rendering to others what is
their due suum cuique. Thomas states that "among all the
moral virtues it is justice wherein the use of right reason
appears chiefly" (2a2ae. 55,8). That is, the just thing to
do is always determined by the prudential individual using
right reason.
The mean of justice is a real mean. That is, it
renders to the other person exactly what is one's due. It
renders neither more nor less Lhan what is due. In rendering
less than what is one's due we fail to reach the requirements
of justice. And in rendering more than what is one's due we
overstep the requirements of justice. Justice consists in
rendering to another what is his or her due according to
right reason.
Justice is that moral virtue that regards the will
(1a2ae. 61,2). The good is the object of the will (1a2ae.
56,6). The will naturally acts for the good. However, this
does not mean that all actions are, by definition, morally
85
good actions. The will needs the direction and guidance of
right reason in order to insure that the good is pursued in
the right way. But prudence not only regulates the "rational
appetite" (i.e. the will), it also molds the sensitive
appetites as well.
Prudence is responsible for regulating the irascible
and concupiscible appetites. The virtues that correspond to
these appetites are fortitude and temperance respectively.
Their proper functions are to be in accord with right reason
as determined by prudence.
To be conformed to right reason is the proper
purpose of any moral virtue. The intent of
temperance is to prevent us from straying from
reason because of our lusts; of fortitude lest we
forsake the judgment of right reason because of
fear or rashness . . . . Yet quite how and through
what we strike the virtuous mean, this is the
business of prudence (2a2ae. 47,7).
Temperance and fortitude are virtues in so far as prudence
rationally regulates the concupiscible and irascible
appetites.
In regulating the sensitive appetites, prudence chooses
a mean between excess and deficiency. It is in this sense
that "moral virtue observes a mean" (1a2ae. 64,1). The
sensitive appetites concern the individual are "interior"
passions, as they concern only the agent that has the
appetite. The concupiscible and irascible appetites will
vary from person to person. For example, a large person will
require more food for a meal than a much smaller person.
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Yet, it is just as wrong for a larger person to overeat as it
is for a smaller person. Prudence should choose a mean
relative to each person.
In reasoning rightly about any given moral issue, the
moral agent must apprehend the moral principle involved,
assesses the nature of relevant contingencies, applies the
universal to the particular and acts upon his deliberation.
Prudence fulfills these requirements by virtue of having
three principal elements: (1) deliberation (2) judgment and
(3) command (1a2ae. 57,5 & la2ae. 58,4).
There are three "virtual parts" of prudence, according
to Thomas (2a2ae. 51). These principle parts include
deliberation (euboulia), sound judgment (synesis), and the
"wit to deal with exceptional cases" (gnome) (2a2ae. 51,4).
We will consider these three allied virtues of prudence.
As regards deliberation, Thomas claims that it is an
inquiry about certain things to be done (1a2ae. 14).
Moreover, these "things to be done "are singular contingent
matters" (1a2ae. 14). As an inquiry it proceeds according to
a specific mode of demonstration. This mode of demonstration
is that of resolution as our inquiry begins from "what is
intended in the future" and it will "continue until one
arrives at what must be done at once" (1a2ae. 14,5). Thomas
means that we must act for that ultimate end that is desired.
From that end, we reason until we find those actions that
will accomplish the end in the most appropriate manner. We
a
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deliberate until we arrive at that action that should be
pursued immediately.
Deliberation, therefore, does not concern the ends to
be attained, but only the most appropriate means to those
ends (1a2ae. 14,1). Thomas calls the ability of good
deliberation eubulia (In Ethic. VI,8). Thomas claims that
this involves the "rectitude of deliberation in relation to
an absolutely good end, by suitable methods and at an
opportune time" (In Ethic. VI,8).
With regard to deliberation, the prudent individual
will also possess four other characteristics. The prudent
character will also possess a good memory, insight,
docility, and acumen.
Memory is a component part of prudence because people
notice what happens in the majority of cases when one does a
certain activity. This must be accounted for in
deliberation. In the majority of cases the idiom "honesty is
the best policy" holds true as it makes for reliable and
felicitous relations between individuals in community.
Furthermore, we build upon these experiences and retain them
for future reference (2a2ae. 49,1).
While deliberating the prudent individual will also
gain insight, as insight correctly grasps certain ultimate
principles that must be "assumed as self-evident" for
prudence to function. Moreover, these self-evident
principles are used as our first principles of demonstration.
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However, Thomas notes that prudence does not simply use
insight as the sole source of active principles. He claims
that
The reasoning involved in prudence draws on a
double understanding. One, the understanding of
general principles, which is for that understanding
which is classed as an intellectual virtue; it is a
habit of mind whereby nature we see general
principles, not only of theory but of practice as
well. . . . The other understanding is . . . seeing
the ultimate particular or factual principle of
practice, expressed in a proposition which is the
minor premise in the reasoning of prudence (2a2ae.
49,2).
While insight provides us with our general principle of
action, we find that we must also take the circumstances of
the particular instance into consideration.
The third component part of prudence required for good
deliberation Thomas calls 
"docility."4 
This component
embraces the idea that certain aspects of prudence can be
taught. That is, we need to be educated by our elders. The
reason for this is simple. Older individuals usually have
experience in moral matters. They know in what circumstances
what principles, supplied by insight, should be employed.
Their judgments are usually sound ones (2a2ae. 49,3).
Deliberation also requires acumen, Or eustochia.
Thomas notes that acumen is "a flair for finding the right
course in sudden encounters" as developed by the prudent
individual (2a2ae. 49,4). Acumen aims at the correct
estimate of the results of a course of action. We gain
these estimates either by learning from others or by actually
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doing the estimation ourselves. Acumen is this latter type
of estimation that manifests itself at a moment's notice.
We must now consider judgment. Thomas calls sound
judgment, synesis (In Ethic. VI,9). This type of judgment
concerns what is usually the case in moral reasoning.
Generally, we should return borrowed items. From this
general principle, we can judge that it is right to return
the gun I borrowed from my neighbor when he requests it from
me, under normal conditions. The judgment in this case is
one of synesis. However, there is a kind of judgment used in
exceptional cases. This is prudence's third allied virtue.
Thomas calls the third allied virtue to prudence gnome
(2a2ae. 51,4). Gnome is used in exceptional cases where
ordinary judgments do not suffice. When my neighbor, in a
fit of rage, requests his gun back from me, I judge that the
borrowed item in question should not be returned as my
neighbor may harm someone with it. In this case, the
judgment is one of gnome, as normal circumstances do not
apply.
The component part of prudence that corresponds to the
allied virtues of synesis and gnome is reasoned judgment
(2a2ae. 49,5). This element is crucial as Thomas claims that•
we must have it "in order that general principles may be
rightly applied to particular issues that are various and
uncertain" (2a2ae. 49,5,ad1).
The key part of prudence, in terms of its virtual
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parts, is command imperium. According to Thomas
it is clear that in regard to things which are done
by man, the principle act is command, to which the
other acts are ordered (1a2ae. 57,6).
We find that both deliberation and judgment are ordered to
command. Command is the end to which these other acts are
ordered. Furthermore, command perfects the practical reasc.
The third act (i.e. command), however, is proper to
the practical intellect insofar as it is productive
(1a2ae. 57,6).
An agent must not only be able to deliberate well and judge
well, but the agent must be able to command the action. If
one cannot, or will not, command the action the practical
intellect remains imperfect. While knowledge is indeed
necessary for virtue, inasmuch as one can deliberate and
judge well, it is insufficient for virtue if one does not
command the act in question.
There are three component parts of prudence that
correspond to command. These are foresight, circumspection
and caution. These enable the prudent individual to see the
consequences of any proposed action.
Prudence derives its name From foresight. Prudence
comes from the latin pprro videns which means "to look
ahead." Foresight (provedentia) has two distinctive
characteristics; (1) it always regards contingencies, and (2)
it always has a purpose (2a2ae. 49,6). That is, foresight is
the capacity to know how to adapt present situations in order
to accomplish some purpose. Foresight regards the action we
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undertake in the present as an attempt to bring about an
expected future state of affairs.
A second component part of prudence is circumspection.
Circumspection is the capacity to take account of those
relevant circumstances of any given situation that might
affect the moral nature of the act commanded.
The third and final component part of prudence
regarding command Thomas calls caution. The prudent
individual recognizes that some actions may have negative
results, and is careful to avoid these problems.
In commanding action, the formal cause of the act is
the will while the material and efficient cause is the will
as noted above.5 The intellect presents the act to the will,
which assents to the command in question. So, prudence
necessarily involves the intellect and the will. "And so
there is included in prudence both the act of the will which
concerns the end and knowledge of the end" (On Truth. V,1).
"Prudence presupposes the willing of the right end." The
will must he habituated in a right way so that the act is
completed. Without the cooperation of the will, command will
not result and the agent will not become moral.
Another way of looking at the issue is to consider how
knowledge functions in moral virtue. One can consider
knowledge from a variety of perspectives, according to
Thomas. These perspectives include considerations of the
mode, end, and object of any type of knowledge.
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Some knowledge is speculative only, some is
practical only, and some is partly speculative and
partly practical . . . it must be observed that
knowledge can be called speculative in three ways:
first, in relation to things known, which are not
operable by the knower; such is the knowledge of
man about natural or divine things. Secondly, as
regards the manner of knowing--as, for instance, if
a builder were to consider a house by defining and
dividing, and considering what belongs to it in
general: for this is to consider operable things in
a speculative manner, and not as they are operable;
for operable means the application of form to
matter, and not the resolution of the composite
into its universal formal principles. Thirdly, as
regards the end; for the practical intellect
differs from the speculative by its end, as the
Philosopher says. For the practical intellect is
ordered to the end of operation; whereas the end of
the speculative intellect is the consideration of
truth. Hence if a builder were to consider how a
house can be made, but without ordering this to the
end of operation, but only towards knowledge, this
would be only a speculative consideration as
regards the end, although it concerns an operable
thing (la. 14,16).
The mixtures of practical and speculative knowledge are
exemplified by the "housebuilder" example. The first example
of speculative knowledge regards "divine" things that are not
operables. The second regards operables as definable, i.e.
what we talk about when we discuss a particular operable,
what we mean by "house." And the final example concerns how
a house can be built, without the actual production of the
house.
The first type of knowledge regards the object of
knowledge. Is the object of knowledge an operable or a
non-operable? If the object cannot be produced by the human
agent (e.g. a rock), the object is a non-operable. If the
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object can be produced by the human agent (e.g. a house), the
object of knowledge is an operable.
The second way in which knowledge can be considered is
by the manner of knowing. If one considers the house as an
operable, one must inquire into the constituent parts of the
house and how to make them. How is it possible to construct
a house? However, the intent of the knower is not
application but knowledge for its own sake.
The third way in which knowledge can be considered
concerns the intent of the knower. Does the knower intend
action? If the knower intends to actually use his knowledge
of housebuilding in order to build a house, the knowledge is
6"completely practical knowledge." This last type of
knowledge, completely practical knowledge, is required for
moral virtue. And the capacity to command the act in
question makes this type of knowledge completely practical.
In this chapter we have seen that as prudence is right
reasoning about things to be done, it has both a cognitive
and an appetitive element. Furthermore, for virtue to
function effectively one's thinking must be correct and one
must possess rectitude of the will.
One obtains a rightly ordered will by cultivating the
other moral virtues. In fact, prudence presupposes the
possession of justice, fortitude and temperance. And in each
of the other moral virtues, right reason plays a critical
role.
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Prudence has three essential elements: right
deliberation, right judgment, and command. But it is command
that sets prudence apart as a practical, moral virtue.
Anyone can deliberate and judge well, but it is only the
prudent individual who also commands the act in question.
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CHAPTER 6
NATURAL LAW, RIGHT REASON AND VIRTUE
In his important article, "Is Thomas Aquinas a Natural
Law Ethicist?" Vernon Bourke observed that the "Treatise on
Law" occupies a place of minor importance in the section on
morality in the Summa Theologiae.
All eighty-nine Questions preceding the treatise on
law are devoted to the discrimination between good
and evil in human conduct. The main burden of these
twelve-hundred pages in the Latin text is not that
natural law enables man to distinguish good from
evil: rather, these eighty-nine Questions
repeatedly state what is good for man, and what is
evil, musti be determined by the use of human
reasoning.
Bourke saw correctly that reason is the primary element in
Thomas's moral theory. It is reason, rightly used, that
accounts for the intelligibility of Thomas's teleological
conceptions of natural law and virtue.
In this final chapter we shall briefly review the
relationship between natural law and virtue and observe how
right reason is foundational to both concepts. On this basis
it will be easy to show how those who view Thomas solely as a
natural law ethicist are mistaken.
From our discussion in the preceeding chapters, it can
be seen Thomas bases his entire moral theory on a
teleological conception of human nature. Teleology permeates
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his account of the natural law, moral virtue and every moral
act.
It is the function of right reason, first, to
apprehend appropriate human goods. Secondly, right reason
operates in the acquisition of moral virtue. And finally, it
is seen most clearly in the particular case of a moral
action. First, we shall observe how natural law is
fundamentally teleological and how right reason is operative
on this most general level. Next, we shall consider the
teleological nature of moral virtue and right reason's role
in the acquisition of moral virtue. Finally, we shall see
how every moral action, ideally, seeks to achieve an end in
accordance with right reason.
Law is a command of reason. When law operates
correctly it orders agents to their appropriate ends. All
laws can be viewed in this manner. The eternal law directs
all beings to their appropriate ends. Natural law is the
rational agent's participation in the eternal law. Human
laws direct a citizenry to the ends of society. When we
consider natural and human laws, we find that these rational
commands facilitate persons in their pursuit of happiness.
The reason for this is that these types of laws are founded
on right reason, and ultimately upon divine reason.
Any action, or law, that is rational is good. It is
proper for entities to act in accordance with their nature.
As man is rational animal, it is fitting for him to act
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rationally (i.e. in conformity with his formal nature).
Laws, then, are good when they direct men according to reason
and had when they depart from reason. Thomas says that "all
laws in so far as they share in right reason to that extent
derive from the eternal law" (1a2ae. 93,3). Furthermore,
A human law has the force of law to the extent that
it falls in with right reason: as such it derives
from the eternal law. To the extent chat it falls
away from right reason it is called a wicked law
(1a2ae. 93,3,ad2).
If a law fulfills its function properly, it participates in
right reason on a general level. Natural law, then, reasons
rightly about the constitutive goods for humanity on a
universal level, in accord with the requirements of eternal
law. McInerny states that "it is the humble but important
function of natural law to say obviously true things about
moral agents, to sketch at a level of great universality the
constituents of the human good."2 Thomas states that
in those things which are done voluntarily, the
proximate standard is human reason, but the supreme
standard is the eternal law. Therefore, whenever
man's act proceeds to the end, in accordance with
the order of reason and of the eternal law, then
the act is right. . . . Now, that human reason is
the standard, by means of which the goodness of the
human will may be measured, is due to the eternal
law, which is divine reason (1a2ae. 21,1)
Right reason operates on a general level in natural law. It
states what the truly human goods are and it also states what
kinds of actions always promote or thwart the pursuit of
those goods.
In the most generic sense, the first principle of
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natural law functions as a guide to all human activity. This
first principle of the practical intellect (i.e. to pursue
the good and avoid evil) provides the starting point for all
human activity. In addition to the fivst principle of
natural law, there are also primary precepts of the natural
law that articulate, on the most universal level, those
actions that are always right or always wrong. These primary
precepts always direct the human agent to his or her good.
These precepts include commands like "Do not murder" and "Be
just."
These precepts are derived from human nature. The
agent, by using reason, sees that some actions always result
in destructive consequences. Murder, for example, always
destroys community. As a sound community is necessary for
happiness, murder cannot be tolerated. The reason why
certain actions are always forbidden depends on a specific
view of human nature and human ends.
The human being is a unity constituted of vegetative,
sensitive and rational soul. Each power is directed to a
particular function, or end. Yet, it is the rational part of
the soul that must determine how each good is to be pursued.
The principles of natural law derive from the ends that
are pursued by the various powers of the soul according to
the rule of reason. Sexual reproduction is a human good.
Yet, it ceases to be good when pursued in ways repugnant to
reason: for example, with a partner who is not one's spouse,
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or at an inappropriate time. The precepts of natural law,
therefore, are based upon a particular view of human nature--
a view that holds that ends are to be pursued in rational
ways. The primary precepts of natural law do not
specifically determine how one should pursue the various
goods of the soul according to reason in particular
situations.
Human law makes the precepts of natural law more
specific. Human law is derived from the natural law, as "in
the sciences demonstrated conclusions are drawn from the
principles" (1a2ae. 95,2). Human laws are particular
expressions of precepts falling under the general headings of
natural law. They articulate on a more specific level what
the natural law states on the universal level. Thus, we
conclude from the principle "harm no one,It as given by
natural law, that "one should not kill." Yet, this attempt
to provide humanity with practical norms for behavior is also
inadequate.
There are two major problems with working out a moral
theory based solely on the precepts of law. First, while
human law gives us more specific norms, it fails to provide
us with guidelines for action when two conflicting principles
are needed, as in the case of the mentally disturbed neighbor
who wants his weapon returned. Thus, human laws cannot
possibly be framed to meet some rare particular incidents"
(In Ethic. V,16). If we consider two routes of deliberation
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one might take in working through the problem case of the
mentally disturbed neighbor, contradictory arguments can be
generated. In one case, one concludes that the weapon should
not be returned because the neighbor will use it for an evil
purpose. In the other case, one may conclude that the weapon
ought to he returned as "Borrowed items should be returned."
There is clearly something wrong with this reasoning. The
problem is that a secondary precept of natural law does not
hold absolutely. It is possible that in some cases
individuals may be inclined to work out their deliberation
using this misguided premise. Thus, human law, like natural
law, can fail to guide the agent correctly regarding some
particular situation.
Morally good reasoning results only in conclusions, or
judgments of conscience, that have been demonstrated from the
first principles of natural law. Morality needs more than a
judgment of what may or may not be right in a given
situation. Furthermore, judgment does not necessitate action
on the part of the agent. This is the Platonic problem of
whether knowledge is sufficient for virtue. I may form a
practical syllogism utilizing the precepts of natural law and
human law when deliberating about any given action. For
example, one may know that adultery is forbidden by the
natural law and one can conclude that this act of adultery is
to be avoided. However, one may know that the conclusion is
true, and yet not act upon it (e.g. due to passion).
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In order to complement what the general precepts of law
say about human nature on the level of generality and
universality and to provide a principle of action in addition
to judgment, Thomas needs an account of human virtue.
Virtue involves "right reasoning about particular
cases" and being "rightly disposed with regard to particular
principles, which are ends or goals" (1a2ae. 58,5). The
prudent individual, i.e. the virtuous person, must be able to
reason well about how to act, and this person must be able to
act upon the judgments of practical reason in a way that
reflects the desire to do good.
First, the virtuous person must be able to reason
rightly about particular cases. To understand particular
cases the agent must be able to deliberate well about the
means to a given end, taking into consideration the relevant
circumstances. Following upon deliberation, the individual
will judge correctly about what is to be done. But most
importantly, the virtuous person will be able to command the
judgment that is the conclusion of deliberation.
One is able to command action because one has acquired
the moral virtues of justice, fortitude, and temperance.
One must have appetites that are appropriately disposed to
their proper objects. Since the virtuous person possesses
appetites that are rationally ordered, this person is able to
command action without being unduly influenced by passion Or
malice because the virtuous person desires what truly
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perfects the agent.
The virtuous person desires the truly human goods
because the desiring the goods has become connatural to the
agent. The agent has developed a character that desires the
good and is repulsed by the evil in particular situations.
As has been shown elsewhere (1a2ae. 94,3), Thomas holds
that one can refer to acts of virtue in two ways. First,
insofar as they are virtuous, and second, insofar as they are
actions of a certain kind. When one considers acts of virtue
in the first way, one finds that all acts of virtue are
matters for natural law. Thomas claims that this follows
because the natural law concerns everything to which man
inclines by nature. All things incline to activities in
accordance with their nature. Since man is a rational
animal, it follows that he should act by using his reason.
Yet virtue also concerns acting in accord with reasor. He
therefore concludes that all acts of virtue are matters of
natural law. In other words, every act commanded by natural
law is a virtuous kind of action.
While the natural law articulates the precepts of right
reason on the universal level, virtue dictates what
specifically is required of the agent. Natural law states
that one is to "Be just." Virtue then tells the agent what
the just thing is, given the present circumstances. For
example, one may be required to pay one's parents respect, as
this is a way of rendering to someone what is his or her due.
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Virtue, then, is seen as right reason operating on the
particular level. In this way, Thomas asserts that all acts
of virtue are acts of natural law.
One can also consider acts of virtue insofar as they
are a certain type of action. In this case not all acts of
virtue are matters of natural law. This is proved from the
following. Some acts are not immediately prompted by human
nature. An example of this might be giving generously tc a
beggar who looks and smells offensive. Thus, as some actions
are not prompted by human nature they must be reasoned out
before so that one knows that they are helpful in the
attainment of the good life. Natural law does not prompt all
kinds of actions, only those that are universally accepted as
promoting the good and avoiding the evil. One must possess
virtue so that one may knew what to do in each particular
moral encounter.
The virtuous person's will is in accordance with law.
His or her will harmonizes with the dictates of the law.
The virtuous person finds murder repugnant because it
conflicts with the good disposition of his or her rightly
ordered will. Thus, the virtuous person needs no law as his
or her will is already rightly ordered to the human good.
These observations regarding the relation of law to
virtue raise an important point. The moral goodness of an
action depends on the fourfold nature of goodness found in
human action. Natural law determines the kind, or object, of
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the act, according to right reasoning functioning on a
universal level. Some actions are categorically wrong.
However, right reason does not only function on the universal
level of the primary precepts of natural law. Right
reasoning functions when one considers particular cases.
When one considers particular cases one must also consider
the end for which one is acting, as well as the
circumstances. The virtuous person (i.e. the agent who
possesses right reason) will be aware of not only the kind of
action in question, but wills it for the right end and in the
right circumstances. But let us take a look at how the
virtuous person acts in a particular instance.
Teleology explains all human action. The agent must
first apprehend the end that is to be pursued. The end,
thus, functions as a first principle for all action. For
example, the agent apprehends that the poor should be helped.
This apprehension depends on the moral character of the
agent. Virtue provides a stable disposition from which all
good actions will proceed. This good disposition affects the
way in which the end is perceived. Thus, the virtuous person
apprehends this end (i.e. helping the poor) as a good that is
to be pursued by the agent. Furthermore, the agent not only
wishes for the end but also proceeds to intend the end as an
action that should be undertaken.
The agent naturally moves to deliberation.
Deliberation inquires into the most appropriate means to
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achieve the intended end. Good deliberation will consider
only those means that are appropriate to rational beings. In
this way, deliberation is a form of right reasoning about
things to be done. The agent will exclude from his
deliberation actions that are contrary to human nature, e.g.
stealing and murder. In helping the poor one may never
murder or steal in order to assist the poor, as these actions
are repugnant to reason.
The agent, after deliberation, makes a choice about
which action to perform, commands and wills that act. For
example, the agent decides that he should help the poor by
giving twenty percent of his income to the local charity.
This act is chosen, commanded and willed. Furthermore, the
agent is able to act because he possesses the moral virtues
which make commanding and willing the act possible. Thus, we
can see, even in the case of a particular act, teleology is
primary, and right reason functions in the attainment of that
end. It is clear that a fundamental teleology pervades his
entire moral theory.
Not all interpreters see Thomas's moral theory in terms
of the primacy of human teleology and right reason. The
so-called natural law interpreters have completely neglected
to consider the basic teleology of Thomas's moral theory.
Furthermore, they fail to mention the primary significance of
right reason. They claim that Thomistic ethics is primarily
a moral theory based on natural law. Their claims are three.
CV.
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The first of the three claims is that Thomistic ethics is
dominated by the theory natural law .3 These interpreters seem
to think that natural law is the only element in Thomas's
moral thought.
It is not accurate to regard natural law as the
dominant element in Thomas's moral theory. While natural law
supplies the moral agent with the first principles of
morality it fails to account for the more salient elements of
morality, i.e., that morality is concerned with reasoning
rightly in specific situations and acting upon that reasoned
conclusion in a habitual fashion.
As morality is a practical matter, either doing or
making is required in order to perfect the practical
intellect. It is possible to do moral science by reasoning
to conclusions from the premises supplied by natural law.
But it is possible to refuse to act on the conclusion, due
perhaps to uncontrollable appetite. Knowledge is necessary
but not sufficient for virtue. Prudence, as the chief
virtue, is not only "mother to the [cardinal] virtues [of
justice, temperance, and fortitude]", but it also enables the
moral agent to act upon the conclusions given by practical
right reasoning.
4
 Therefore, it is possible to teach the
principles of moral science using natural law as the first
premise and reasoning to a judgment of conscience about what
to do. Yet, we simply cannot teach prudence which is truly
perfective of the moral agent. Prudence is not something
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that can be taught, because one does not become good by doing
moral philosophy; rather, one becomes good by acting upon
one's moral knowledge of a given moral situation. Moreover,
this capacity to act upon the basis of one's knowledge of the
situation presupposes that the agent possesses justice,
fortitude and temperance.
Secondly, we should note that natural law provides us
with general guidelines only. It does not consider actions
in specific situations. Moreover, it is in concrete
situations that we make moral decisions. Natural law cannot
be considered the dominant element in Thomas's moral theory
because it deals only with the kind of act performed, i.e.
the object of the act. The principles of natural law do not
consider either the relevant circumstances surrounding the
act or the agent's intention in performing the act. The
circumstances and the agent's intention have everything to do
with the morality of the action. For example, if an
individual performs a courageous act, not for the sake of a
good end (e.g. defending his or her children), but for the
sake of vainglory, the act is disordered. If the act takes
place in an inappropriate manner, the act is clearly morally
deficient.
The second claim that the natural law interpreters
assume is that natural law can be treated in isolation from
Thomas's doctrine of virtue. We have already answered this
claim in part by noting that prudence is the necessary
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complement of natural law, not unnecessary intellectual
baggage.
If one attempts to treat natural law separately from
virtue in Thomistic ethics one ignores crucial elements of
Thomas's moral theory. Natural law provides a rational
starting point for Thomas but it does not provide the
principles of virtue as the proximate principles of morality.
Right reason takes us from the principles of natural law to
the action in a particular situation. To treat natural law
as the only element in Thomas's theory is like considering an
auto without an engine -- a mere shell or skeleton without
any power. The agent needs not only the first principles of
ethics that natural law provides, but also the prudent
experience of the "person of right reason."
In the case of the primary precepts of natural law, the
agent is able to discern, by the use of right reason, that
some commands always direct the agent to his or her human
good. In the case of secondary precepts of natural law, the
precepts do not hold with absolute certainty, sometimes these
precepts do not direct the agent to an appropriate human
good, as in the case of returning a weapon to a
psychologically disturbed neighbor. Thus, "law cannot
possibly be framed to meet some rare particular incidents."
(In Ethic. V, 16).
Virtue enables the agent to know the correct thing to
do in particular cases (1a2ae. 58,5). The natural law
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directs the agent to those things that are perfective of
humans, only by means of universal commands. The natural law
fails to articulate what particular actions should be chosen
in particular cases. Moral virtue serves, then, as
articulating on a specific level what the natural law
articulates on the universal level.
The third idea set forth by Thomas's natural law
interpreters is that his moral theory provides humans only
with abstract deontological moral norms. Robinson even
claims that in comparison to Aquinas, Hobbes's moral theory
is much more practical.5 This last claim that the natural
law interpreters make is parasitic upon the prior 'laims we
have already dealt with. Again, we find the criticism arises
because there is no awareness of Thomas's account of virtue.
If by deontological we mean a moral theory of the
Kantian type, Thomas's theory is as conspicuously different
from Kant's as Aristotle's is.
The precepts of natural law are not externally imposed
upon the agent, but always guide the agent to goods that are
perfective of him or her. The reason for these primary
precepts is always in reference to the purpose of human
activity. Murder always frustrates peaceful living among
human beings. The natural law is not a maxim that simply is
inscribed upon the hearts and minds of all humanity; rather,
the natural law provides us with general rules of conduct
that are constitutive of human good. To portray Thomistic
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natural law as deontological is to completely disregard the
fundamental teleology of human nature. The ends of human
nature are family, procreation, intellectual knowledge, and
community living (1a2ae. 94,2). The principles of natural
law derive from the proper ends as prescribed by human
nature. Thomas's moral theory is teleological in nature, not
deontological. The deontologist claims moral norms are
imposed externally and that we should act for the sake of
what is right, not for the sake of an end. The whole purpose
of deliberation and, thus, right reason, is to order actions
rightly to appropriate ends that are perfective of the agent.
In conclusion we must admit that for Thomas natural law
and virtue function together in a complementary fashion.
However, we have proven conclusively that his moral theory is
not dominated by the concept of natural law, nor can we treat
natural law in isolation from his account of virtue without
doing violence to Thomas's moral vision. Furthermore,
Thomas's moral theory is neither abstract nor deontological.
Only a truncated study of the Thomistic corpus could ever
result in the claims the natural law interpreters have
produced. Rather it is founded upon a teleological
conception of human nature that utilizes right reason in the
formation of not only natural law, but moral virtue as well.
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1. Bourke, "Is Thomas Aquinas a Natural Law Ethicist?",
58. McInerny also notes that "it is oddly true that there is
only one place in the vast body of his writings where he
engages in an extended and formal discussion of law and its
various kinds." Ethica Thomistica, 40.
2. McInerny, Art and Prudence. (Notre Dame, IN:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 121.
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4. Pieper, The Four Cardinal Virtues, 22.
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